In This Corner, We Have the Bankruptcy Code\u27s Discharge Provisions and in This Corner, CERCLA, a Strict Liability Statue: In Re Reading Company by Pasquarella, Jennifer A.
Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 6 
1998 
In This Corner, We Have the Bankruptcy Code's Discharge 
Provisions and in This Corner, CERCLA, a Strict Liability Statue: In 
Re Reading Company 
Jennifer A. Pasquarella 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer A. Pasquarella, In This Corner, We Have the Bankruptcy Code's Discharge Provisions and in This 
Corner, CERCLA, a Strict Liability Statue: In Re Reading Company, 9 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 561 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/6 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1998]
IN THIS CORNER, WE HAVE THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S
DISCHARGE PROVISIONS AND IN THIS CORNER, CERCLA, A
STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE: IN RE READING COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
A perpetual conflict has existed between the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code)1 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),2 ever since Congress passed the latter. Congress en-
acted CERCLA to safeguard the public health and welfare by impos-
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)) [hereinafter Bank-
ruptcy Code]. Congress intended the revised version of the Bankruptcy Code "to
modernize the bankruptcy law by codifying a new title 11 that [would] embody the
substantive law of bankruptcy . S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5787.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA], as reauthorized and
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections within 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994)) [hereinafter SARA]. Congress added SARA to CERCLA for
two key reasons. First, it provides the federal government, and therefore the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), with the necessary funding to undertake ex-
tensive environmental cleanup projects. See Catherine A. Barth, Note, EPA Runs
"CERCLAS" Around Bankruptcy Law: In Re CMC Heartland Partners, 5 Vit.. ENVTL.
L.J. 203, 235 n.2 (1994). See generally H.R. REP. No. 96-7020 (1980). Second, SARA
increases CERCIA's capacity "for allocating cleanup costs among responsible par-
ties." Philippe J. Kahn, Note, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental Protection: Discharging
Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CA.Dozo L. REv. 1999, 1999 (1993). Spe-
cifically, SARA (1) authorizes "the government to place a federal lien on the prop-
erty [of a potentially responsible party (PRP)] to secure reimbursement" for the
cleanup costs EPA incurs, and (2) expressly entitles one PRP to contribution from
another for any cleanup expenses incurred because of both parties' actions. De-
nise M. Schuh, Comment, The Cents of It: Dischargeablility and Environmental Claims
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 14 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 191, 199 (1993) (citing CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)); see also CERCLA §§ 107(1), 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(1), 9613(f) (1994). Before Congress enacted SARA, parties seeking con-
tribution relied on the judicially created right of contribution in section 107. See
United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995).
Congress responded to judicial splits over the right to contribution under section
107 by enacting section 113, which supplemented CERCLA with an express contri-
bution provision. See id. Congress stated that its primary objective in including the
new provision was to "clarif[y] and confirm[ I the right of a person held jointly
and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup
or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances." S.
REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of Superfund Amendments
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ing strict liability on parties responsible for environmental
catastrophes. 3 The Bankruptcy Code, however, guarantees all debt-
ors the opportunity for a "fresh start," free of any previous debts or
liabilities. 4 What happens, though, when the two statutes come
head-to-head when a party responsible for an environmental catas-
trophe files for bankruptcy? Are that party's environmental obliga-
tions included in the debts and liabilities discharged as a part of
this "fresh start" policy? If so, are they granted any priority status in
the discharge process? These are important questions, and con-
flicts between the two statutes have traditionally arisen when either
of their underlying policies has been compromised. 5
Is it possible to ensure, as Congress intended, that each party
responsible for an environmental disaster will pay for the cleanup
3. See Roy B. True, Comment, Dischargeability of CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy,
61 UMKC L. REv. 329, 332-33 (1992) (explaining why Congress enacted CERCLA).
Typical environmental catastrophes have included:
The contamination by chemicals of 54 public wells serving 100,000 of
Long Island's residents, the discovery of up to 20,000 to 30,000 barrels of
discarded, leaking, and unlabeled wastes in the "Valley of the Drums" in
Kentucky, the suspected leaching of arsenic and orthonitroaniline into
the water supply of 300,000 people in Charles City, Iowa ....
Superfund: Hearings on H.A 4571, 4566, and 5290 Before the Subcomm. On Trans. &
Commerce of the Comm. On Interstate & Foreign Commerce Comm., 96th Cong. 210
(1980) [hereinafter Superfund Hearings] (statement of Barbara Blum, EPA Deputy
Administrator).
As of 1992, $11 billion dollars of Superfund money had been spent cleaning
up eighty-four environmental disasters, and experts predict more will be spent
over the next few years. See Peter Hong & Michele Galen, The Toxic Mess Called
Superfund, Bus. WI, May 11, 1992, at 32.
4. See Bankruptcy Code § 722, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)-(b)(1994). Specifically, sec-
tion 727(b) provides that "a discharge under subsection (a) of this section dis-
charges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief
... and any liability on a claim that is determined... [to have] arisen before the
commencement of the case . . . " Id.
5. SeeJill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations:
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REv. 137, 173 (1991) (tracing historic conflict between
CERCLA and Bankruptcy Code). Losch states:
Thus far, what reconciliation has occurred has been at the price of
impairment of one of the competing interests. Moreover, in some cases,
"reconciliation" has resulted in the frustration of both the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and those of CERCLA, inconsistent rulings, and a resul-
tant decline in ability of the parties (the debtor and EPA) to develop
effective strategies for the future.
Id. Still, there is no way to predict which policy, if either, will be sacrificed because
"the answer appears to depend on the court, the characterization of harm, and the
presence or lack thereof of unencumbered assets." Id. at 150. But see Brian A.
Cahalane, Note, CERCLA and the Fresh Start: Quelling the Eternal Conflict, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 265, 277 (1996) (stating current trend favors CERCLA's goals
over those of Bankruptcy Code); Kahn, supra note 2, at 2008 (asserting "the ten-
dency has been in favor of empowering the CERCLA liability scheme, [but] this
has not been the case regarding the debtor's discharge on future CERCLA
liabilities").
2
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costs expended, if any party declared bankruptcy and reorganized
under the Bankruptcy Code? This Note discusses the Third Circuit
decision In re Reading Company,6 where the court addressed this
question, and achieved a successful balance between the two stat-
utes. Section II of this Note describes the relevant case law and
statutory provisions that have traced the historical conflict between
the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, and how different circuits have
approached that conflict. Section III sets forth the factual and pro-
cedural history of Reading. Next, Section IV traces the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis, describing how the court arrived at its decision.
Section V examines the soundness and consistency of the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis in Reading. Finally, Section VI focuses on the positive
impact that the Reading court's decision may have upon the Third
Circuit, and possibly other circuits, if confronted with this particu-
lar conflict between CERLCA and the Bankruptcy Code. Specifi-
cally, this section concludes that if courts follow the equitable
solution reached in Reading, bankrupt corporations will have
greater confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.
II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CERCLA
AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. CERCLA
On December 11, 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA in re-
sponse to escalating environmental problems. 7 This sweeping
6. 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
7. SeeJohn C. Ryland, Note, When Policies Collide: The Conflict Between the Bank-
ruptcy Code and CERCLA, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 739 (1994) (explaining purpose of
CERCLA was to protect public health and welfare). According to the federal gov-
ernment, Americans produce over 260 million tons of hazardous waste annually,
and this waste poses serious environmental problems. See Schuh, supra note 2, at
191 n.1 (citing 138 CONG. REc. S95, 23-34 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Specter)). Congress showed its receptiveness to the severity of increasing en-
vironmental abuses when it enacted CERCLA. Congress stated:
Over the past two decades, the Congress has enacted strong environmen-
tal legislation in recognition of the danger to human health and the envi-
ronment posed by a host of environmental pollutants. This field of
environmental legislation has expanded to address newly discovered
sources of such danger as the frontiers of medical and scientific knowl-
edge have been broadened.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt.1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6137. See also O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 719 n.2 (D.R.I. 1988), affd 883
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting "Congress intended broad judicial interpretation
of CERCLA in order to give full effect to two important legislative purposes ...
prompt and effective response to hazardous waste problems and to force those
responsible . . . to bear the cost of their action"); Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (affirming CERCLA estab-
lishes "a means of controlling and financing both governmental and private re-
1998]
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piece of legislation has been described as "the first comprehensive
and self-executing federal statute to address the past as well as the
future release of hazardous substances."8 It provides the federal
government with the means necessary to both identify as well as
cure releases, or threatened releases, of hazardous materials into
the environment. 9 Specifically, CERCLA empowers the President,
who has delegated this authority to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), to: (1) respond to any hazardous release or
threatened release; and (2) work toward its removal. 10 EPA may
sponses to hazardous releases.. . ."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding congressional purpose of CERCLA
is "to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response to haz-
ardous substances released into the environment").
8. Losch, supra note 5, at 139. In Amoco Oil v. Borden, the court explained that
"CERCLA substantially changed the legal machinery used to enforce environmen-
tal cleanup efforts and was enacted to fill gaps left in an earlier statute, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ('RCRA')." Amoco Oil v. Borden,
Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1989). Under RCRA, Congress lacked the author-
ity to order PRPs to clean up abandoned or inactive waste sites unless the sites
posed some imminent threat to the public health or welfare. See id. CERCLA
solved this problem "by establishing a means of controlling and financing both
governmental and private responses to hazardous releases at abandoned and inac-
tive waste disposal sites." Bulk Distribution Ctrs., 589 F. Supp. at 1441. Section 107 is
a key CERCLA provision because it authorizes both the government as well as pri-
vate individuals to seek response costs from PRPs who create a hazardous waste
site. See Amoco Oi4 889 F.2d at 667; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 21 (1989) (stressing "[t]he remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is
sweeping: everyone.., potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination
may be forced to contribute to cleanup costs."). There are limitations, however,
on the costs the government or a private party may collect under section 107. For
example, neither entity is entitled to indemnification unless it "acted to contain a
release threatening the public health or the environment." Amoco Oi4 889 F.2d at
669-70. In addition, section 107 only applies to those costs which are necessary
and in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). See id. at 672 (dis-
cussing NCP and its requirements).
9. SeeJanice L. Green, CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 171, 171-72 (1992); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) (asserting "in CERCLA Congress enacted a broad
remedial statute designed to enhance the authority of the EPA to respond effec-
tively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that threaten[ ] environment and
human health") (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889
F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989)); B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d
Cir. 1992) (same).
10. See Green, supra note 9, at 171. The specific terms of CERCLA authorize
the President to do the following:
[R]emove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action
relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any
time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource), or
take any other response measure . . . which the President deems neces-
sary to protect the public health br welfare or the environment .... The
President shall give primary attention to those releases which the Presi-
dent deems may present a public health threat.
4
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either order the potentially responsible party (PRP)11 to personally
undertake the necessary "remedial or removal actions," or to clean
the contaminated CERCLA site itself and then seek reimbursement,
pursuant to section 107, for costs it incurs. 12 If EPA itself takes
CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994). Once the President has
identified an environmental "hazard", there are three courses of action he may
take. The President may: (1) file for an injunction against the responsible party to
help minimize the environmental threat; (2) fine the responsible party or parties;
or (3) have the federal government clean up the site and later seek indemnity
from the responsible party or parties. See Green, supra note 9, at 171-72 (citing
CERCLA § 104(a)-(b), 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)-(b), 9606(a)). The President
has turned most of this authority over to EPA, which now serves as the primary
government enforcer of CERCLA. See Shawn F. Sullivan, Comment, The Allowance
or Disallowance of Private Party CERCLA Claims in Bankruptcy: A Judicially Forged Con-
flict Between the Code and CERCLA, 3 DicI. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1 n.30 (1993) (refer-
ring to EPA as "the primary enforcer of CERCLA"). Furthermore, CERCLA
"imposed retroactive liability on any person who, prior to the statute's passage, had
disposed of, transported, or arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances."
Reading, 115 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
(Paoli Yard), 944 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1991). Specifically, Congress defines "haz-
ardous substances" in CERCLA as "such elements, compounds, mixtures, solu-
tions, and substances which, when released into the environment may present
substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment .... CER-
CLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1994).
11. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 2054 n.9 (noting that although the term "poten-
tially responsible parties" is used only a few times within CERCLA itself by EPA, the
judicial system and commentators frequently use it "to designate parties that are
liable under CERCLA"). Such liable parties include:
[T] he present owner or operator of the site, any owner or operator in the
past at a time when there was hazardous waste disposed of at the site; any
person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for transporta-
tion and disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance at the site; and
any person or party who transported hazardous waste to a site.
Ryland, supra note 7, at 741 n.12 (quoting CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1994)). For a listing of the liable parties specified in CERCLA section
107(a), see infta note 14 and accompanying text.
12. Ryland, supra note 7, at 741-42. CERCLA describes "removal actions" as
the following:
[T] he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the en-
vironment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release of
hazardous substances .... The term includes ... without being limited
to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alterna-
tive water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened indi-
viduals not otherwise provided for ....
CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994). Thus, removal actions are imme-
diate and short term cleanup actions. See id. Moreover, the government may re-
cover removal costs in full. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265,
1278 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing removal activity as that in which "the government
takes direct action to investigate, evaluate or monitor a release, threat of release, or
a danger posed by such a problem .... ).
CERCLA section 107 empowers EPA to seek retribution from any responsible
party or parties. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). According to section
107(a) (4), a PRP will be liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
5651998]
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either removal or remedial action, the expenses are reimbursed by
CERCLA's Superfund.13
Congress created a strict liability statute to guarantee that re-
sponsible parties may not escape the financial burden of an envi-
by the United States Government or a State . . . , any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person ... , damages for injury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources .... and the costs of any health assessment or health
effects study ...." Id. § 107(a) (4) (A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). These
costs include any accumulated interest as well. CERCLA specifies three situations
where a defendant is not held strictly liable. See id. § 107(b)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (1)-(4). According to CERCLA, a PRP can only escape cleanup costs if
he or she:
[C]an establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting...
were caused solely by (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, (3) an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or an agent of the de-
fendant .... or any combination of the foregoing ....
Id. Remedial actions are different from removal actions because they permanently
remove the hazardous material or threat from the environment. See id. § 101 (24),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
13. See Green, supra note 9, at 172. The Supreme Court has noted that
"[t] here are two primary purposes for which Superfund money may be spent - to
finance 'governmental response,' and to 'pay claims.'" Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475
U.S. 355, 360 (1986). In essence, Congress created the Superfund to finance
EPA's environmental cleanup projects with speed and efficiency. See Cahalane,
supra note 5, at 268; Deborah E. Parker, Comment, Environmental Claims In Bank-
ruptcy: It's a Question of Priorities, 32 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 221, 225 (1995). Congress
imposed special taxes "on chemical and petroleum producers" to finance the
Superfund. Cahalane, supra note 5, at 268 n.19 (citing Scott Wilsdon, Note, Wen
A Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38
HAS-nNcs L.J. 1261, 1264 (1987)). Initially, the fund started with an allotted
budget of $8.5 billion for a five year period. See Schuh, supra note 2, at 199 (citing
CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994)). CERCLA specifies that "there is
authorized to be appropriated from the Hazardous Substance Superfund .. .not
more than $8,500,000,000 for the next 5-year period beginning on October 17,
1986, and not more than $5,100,000,000 for the period commencing October 1,
1991, and ending September 30, 1994, and such sums shall remain available until
expended." Id.
Although it appears that EPA has unrestricted access to Superfund money,
CERCLA imposes several limitations. See Green, supra note 9, at 172 n.13. CER-
CLA states that "[t]he President [and EPA] shall not pay for any administrative
costs or expenses out of the Fund unless such costs and expenses are reasonably
necessary for and incidental to the implementation of this subchapter." CERCLA
§ 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1994). Furthermore, EPA cannot use Superfund
money on remedial actions unless the targeted CERCLA site is recorded on the
National Priorities List (NPL). See Green, supra note 9, at 172 (citing Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1382 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989)). Specif-
ically, "[h] azardous waste sites placed on the EPA's NPL consist of the [most severe
and] heaviest polluted sites in United States." Schuh, supra note 2, at 198. Once a
site is included on the NPL, EPA can take immediate efforts toward its cleanup
using Superfund money. See id. at 198 n.38. As of 1993, the NPL listed approxi-
mately 1,200 sites, and that number has increased over the last three years. See id.
at 198 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300, apps. A, B (1990)). For a general understanding of
the Superfund's uses and limitations, see CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611
(1994).
6
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ronmental disaster caused by their own deliberate or careless acts.14
Not only is the federal government permitted to seek recovery costs
from PRPs, but sections 107(a) (1)-(4) (B) additionally empower pri-
vate plaintiffs incurring cleanup costs to use this course of action as
well. 15 Private parties can seek indemnification from the actual re-
sponsible party or parties pursuant to section 107(a). 16 This private
14. See Nancy Hisey Kratzke, Dischargeability Issues and Superfund Claims: The
Conflict Between Environmental and Bankruptcy Policies, 17 COLUM. J. ENvn. L. 381,
385 (1992). To ease the severity of environmental hazards, "CERCLA creates an
action in strict liability and enables 'the Administrator to pursue rapid recovery of
the costs incurred for the costs of such actions undertaken by him from persons
liable therefor.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-7020, supra note 2, at 17). Thus,
Congress's principle goal was "assuring that those who caused chemical harm bear
the costs of that harm .... S. Doc. No. 97-14, at 320 (1983).
Although CERCLA does not specifically provide for joint and several liability
among PRPs, courts have interpreted it to do so. See Green, supra note 9, at 201
n.19 (citing Katherine Simpson Allen, Belly Up and Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy
and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1037, 1070 n.205 (1985)); Ryland,
supra note 7, at 772 n.18; see, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (asserting "Congress intended that responsible parties be held
strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included
in the compromise..."); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding Congress's deletion of strict liability provisions from
CERCLA "was not intended as a rejection of joint and several liability"). But see
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding "that
although joint and several liability is generally appropriate ... apportionment may
be warranted in certain circumstances"); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting "CERCLA does not specifically provide
for joint and several liability... [and] both the House and Senate deleted provi-
sions imposing joint and several liability from their respective versions of the stat-
ute . . . ."). More specifically, CERCLA section 107(a) imposes joint and several
liability upon:
(1) [T]he owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substance,
(4) and any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
15. SeeJohn C. Cruden, CERCLA Overuiew, SA85 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 517, 532 (1996)
(noting federal government may recover from PRPs under section 107 past and
future response costs, remedial costs, prejudgment interest and enforcement
costs).
16. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1989). Sec-
tion 107(a) is a key provision because it establishes the framework whereby both
1998]
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right of action is, however, only available to innocent parties. Re-
sponsible parties must instead rely upon section 113(f).17 Specifi-
the "government and private plaintiffs [may] recover from responsible parties the
costs incurred in cleaning up and responding to hazardous substances .... " In re
Reading, 115 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d. Cir. 1997). See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Ste-
pan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (asserting private right of
action exists under section 107(a) (4) (b) and stating "the liability provision is an
integral part of the statute's method of achieving this goal for it gives a private
party the right to recover its response costs from responsible third parties which it
may choose to pursue . . . ."). Section 107 sets forth the four elements that are
necessary to impose CERCLA liability for past environmental offenses. The statute
requires the following:
(1) [T] he defendant falls within one of the four categories of 'responsi-
ble parties'
(2) the hazardous substances [must be]... disposed [of] at a 'facility'
(3) there [must be] ... a "release" or threatened release of hazardous
substances from the facility into the environment
(4) [and] the release [must] cause[ ] the incurrence of "response costs."
CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994); see also Reading, 115 F.3d at 1118 (quoting
language of CERCLA section 107); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 964 F.2d
252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing same criteria as Reading court). For a dis-
cussion of the parties included in CERCLA's definition of responsible parties, see
supra notes 11 and 14 and accompanying text.
Once those criteria are established, section 107(a) (4) (B) lists four potential
categories of damages for which the guilty party may be held financially liable.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994). This liability
includes:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction,
or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this tide.
Id. Before the SARA amendments in 1986, and in particular the express contribu-
tion provision of section 113 (f), the federal government or a private plaintiff could
have asserted a contribution claim against a PRP pursuant to section 107(a) (4) (B).
See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117. As originally enacted, CERCLA lacked any express
provision granting one PRP the right to recover costs from another PRP. See id. In
response, "[c]ourts filled the gap by interpreting section 107(a) (4) (B) as provid-
ing a private right of action by which a party who had expended resources on
cleanup efforts, could obtain contribution from others." Id. at 1118; see, e.g., Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 n.7 (1994) (stating courts "have
been virtually unanimous in holding that § 107(a) (4) (B) creates a private right of
action for the recovery of necessary response costs") (citing Walls v. Waste Re-
source Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985)); United States v. New Castle
County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (recognizing "[a] right to contri-
bution would encourage expeditious settlement of Superfund suits"). Therefore,
this judicially-created right was the only vehicle parties had available to them to
secure contribution before the 1986 SARA amendments. See Reading, 115 F.3d at
1119.
17. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119. For example, in United Tech. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Ind., Inc., the First Circuit held that it was evident from the plain
8
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cally, section 113(f) enables one PRP to seek contribution costs
from another PRP who has escaped paying for an environmental
hazard to which they contributed.18
language of the two statutory provisions that Congress intended sections 107 and
113 to address two different causes of action, one for complete indemnification
and the other for contribution. 33 F.3d 96, 98 (1st Cir. 1994). The First Circuit
stated that "[a]lthough Congress did not explicitly plot the boundary that divides
these two types of action, we are not wholly without guidance. Under accepted
cannons of [statutory] construction, legal terms used in framing a statute are ordi-
narily presumed to have been intended to convey their customary legal meaning."
Id. at 99. See also, New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1120-23 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding Congress intended "contribution" to mean that
responsible parties may recoup only portion of their costs under section 113(f),
via plain meaning interpretation); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d
1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding specific language of section 113(f) controls
between "jointly and severally liable parties"); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating section 113(f) governs contribu-
tion claims); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting "quintessential claim for contribution" is claim where one liable party
seeks allocation of cleanup costs between itself and another PRP).
Once Congress amended CERCLA with SARA, section 113(f) in particular,
parties gained an express statutory provision authorizing contribution recovery.
See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119. Section 113(f) states in pertinent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable . . . during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. ... In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropri-
ate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an
action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of
this title or section 9607 of this title.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
Congressional intent supports a plain reading of the statute. Congress stated:
This amendment clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly
and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other po-
tentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share
.... The amendment should encourage private party settlements and
cleanups.... Private parties may be more willing to assume the financial
responsibility for cleanup if they are assured that they can seek contribu-
tion from others.
S. REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985). Clearly, Congress passed the SARA amendments
to both clarify and guarantee the available private right of action under CERCLA.
See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119. Therefore, "the language of § 113(f), permitting
contribution, replaced the judicially created right to contribution under
§ 107(a) (4) (B)." Id.
18. See Reading, 115 F. 3d, at 1120-21; see also David B. Lilly Co. v. Fisher, 18
F.3d 1112, 1123 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding contribution is only available if contribu-
tor and defendant share joint liability with plaintiff); Green v. United States, 775
F.2d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating "contribution require[s] a common liability
of the party charged and the party sought to be charged to the injured party for
the same damages"). The Seventh Circuit defined "contribution" as a claim "by
and between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the
payment one of them has been compelled to make." Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764.
More specifically, Black's Law Dictionary defines contribution as:
19981 569
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B. The Bankruptcy Code
Congress originally created the Bankruptcy Act in 1898 with
two specific purposes: (1) to provide a debtor with a "fresh start";
and (2) to distribute the debtor's remaining assets among his or
her creditors in the most equitable and orderly manner possible. 19
In Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Supreme
Court held:
The sharing of a loss or payment among several. The act of any one or
several of a number of co-debtors, co-sureties, etc., in reimbursing one of
their number who has paid the whole debt or suffered the whole liability,
each to the extent of his proportionate share.
BLcAc's LAw DIArIONaY 328 (6th ed. 1990). CERCLA section 113(f) (1) addresses
contribution actions and provides in part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Fed-
eral law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate re-
sponse costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate.
CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1994).
In essence, CERCLA provides private parties with two distinct avenues of legal
action. See Halliburton, 111 F.3d at 1120. Private parties may either reclaim all of
their costs through a section 107(a) cost recovery action, or reclaim only part of
the costs pursuant to a section 113(f) action for contribution. Seeid. Section 107 is
only available to innocent parties because it imposes strict liability on the responsi-
ble party or parties. See id. at 1120-21; United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99-100; see also Colo-
rado & E. RR. Co., 50 F.3d at 1535 (holding "it is now well settled that § 107
imposes strict liability on [potentially responsible persons]"); Tippins Inc. v. USX
Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1994) (defining CERCLA as strict liability statute and
holding PRPs "financially accountable for the costs associated with a remedial or
removal action . . ." ).
In contrast, section 113 permits courts to apportion the response costs be-
tween the PRPs in an equitable manner. See Halliburton, 111 F.3d at 1121 (quoting
CERCLA § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1)). For example, in Rumpke of Indiana,
Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., the Seventh Circuit held that section 113(f) was in-
tended to allocate recovery costs among responsible parties. 107 F.3d 1235, 1240
(7th Cir. 1997). According to the Rumpke court, while a PRP should not be permit-
ted to fully escape liability by recovering all of its response costs, it should not have
to bear the full burden when other parties are involved. See Halliburton, 111 F.3d at
1122. This was the sole purpose of the SARA amendment. See Kahn, supra note 2,
at 2002. SARA's legislative history supports the proposition that Congress specifi-
cally recognized and provided for the right of contribution in section 113(f),
stating:
[Section 113(f)] clarifies and confirms the right of a person heldjointly
and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other po-
tentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
share of the cleanup costs that may be greater than its equitable share
under the circumstances.
H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1986). After it is determined that multiple parties
are in fact involved, it is then within the court's discretion to determine how the
costs should be apportioned.
19. See Ryland, supra note 7, at 742; Green, supra note 9, at 174.
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It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert the assets
of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among credi-
tors, and then to relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and to permit him to
start afresh from the obligations and responsibilities con-
sequent upon business misfortunes. 20
20. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1915); see also, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (reaffirming
main purpose of Bankruptcy Act as "a new opportunity in life [of debtor] and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
existing debt."). The goal of the revised Bankruptcy Code has remained virtually
the same over the past seventy years. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R.
31 and 32 Before the Subcomm. On Civil & Constitutional Rights of the Comm. On the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 159-60 (1975) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Revision Hearings]
(statement of Prof. Frank R. Kennedy, University of Michigan Law School). The
federal government still believes it is necessary to provide a debtor with a "fresh
start," after he or she declares bankruptcy. See id. Congressional hearings note
that "[t] he idea is to give the bankrupt debtor a fresh start, a clean slate so that he
can become an effective member of society and the economy free to work and
.contribute to production and to earn a livelihood for himself and for his family."
Id. Congress has also stated that "whether the debtor uses Chapter 7, Liquidation,
or Chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of An Individual, bankruptcy relief should be
effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start." H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6081.
Interestingly, neither statement addresses the fact that the "fresh start" policy
does not apply to all debtors equally. See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 727 n.8 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson Law Review].
Corporations and other non-individuals specified in the Bankruptcy Code will only
receive a discharge of their debts if they first reorganize in the way Chapter 11
requires. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Note, Undermining Bankruptcy Law and Policy:
Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 627, 646 n.108 (1995) (citing Bankruptcy Code § 1141(d), 11
U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1994)); see also DAVID BAIRD & THOMAS JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRuPTcY, at 729-816 (1985) (stating automatic
discharge is not applicable to corporations); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BAN.RuPTcv LAw 227 n.5 (1986) (stating "[c]orporations must reorgan-
ize before they can obtain a discharge.") [hereinafter Jackson Law Review]. Some
commentators assert that "[t]he idea of a 'fresh start' for corporations and other
non-individuals is thus more appropriately viewed as 'debtor rehabilitation,' one of
the congressional goals of the Bankruptcy Code." Heidt, supra, at 646 (citing S.
REP. No 95-989, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795). Moreover,
expert opinion is divided regarding where corporations actually fall within the
Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy. For example, some commentators assert
that "[c]orporations do not need a 'fresh start' because state-law limited liability
rules provide the equivalent." Jackson Law Review, supra, at 727 n.8 (citing Richard
A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 499
(1976)). Other commentators, however, argue that corporations should not even
be granted a "fresh start." See Gary M. Roberts, Note, Bankruptcy and the Union's
Bargain: Equitable Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1015,
1028 (1987).
For bankruptcy purposes:
"Corporation" shall include all bodies having any of the powers and privi-
leges of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships
and shall include partnership associations organized under laws making
the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the association,
19981
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The current Bankruptcy Code serves much the same purpose as the
unrevised Bankruptcy Act did in 1915.21 Individuals and business
entities experiencing financial hardships may file for bankruptcy,
and any remaining debts or claims are subsequently settled during
bankruptcy proceedings. 22
There are two distinct options available to a bankrupt entity
under the Bankruptcy Code's provisions. It may either file for com-
plete liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or, by
using a reorganization plan, regroup and "reorganize" into a new,
debt-free entity.2 3 In essence, Chapter 11 reorganization gives the
bankrupt entity a second chance in the business world by granting
it immediate debt relief 24 Upon choosing this option, the debtor is
granted protection from creditors and must then draft and file a
joint stock companies, unincorporated companies and associations, and
any business conducted by a trustee or trustees ....
Bankruptcy Code § 1(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1976). Railroad companies are in-
cluded within this definition, and the Code has special provisions for the reorgani-
zation of bankrupt rail entities. See id. § 1164-1174, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174.
21. See Bankruptcy Revision Hearings, supra note 20, at 60.
22. See Green, supra note 9, at 174. Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, he or
she receives a protective injunction which prohibits creditors from raising any fu-
ture monetary claims against the debtor. See Richard P. Krasnow & Debra
Dandeneau, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, SB37 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 127, 132 (1997).
23. See Ryland, supra note 7, at 740. Liquidation is a part of Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy and the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code are sections 701-766 of
title 11 of the United States Code. Section 726 is the general distribution section,
specifying the particular order in which the debtor's remaining assets are liqui-
dated. See Bankruptcy Code § 726, 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994). Importantly, the dis-
charge provisions of Chapter 7 are not available to "a railroad, insurance company,
bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, homestead as-
sociation, or credit union." Barth, supra note 2, at 212 n.45 (citing Bankruptcy
Code § 109(b)(1)-(3), 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)-(3)). Corporations are somewhat dif-
ferent because although Chapter 7 is available to those entities, filing a claim
under that chapter will not discharge their debts. See Barth, supra note 2, at 212
n.45 (citing Bankruptcy Code § 727(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1) (1988)). Instead,
the corporation's assets are liquidated and used to pay off its creditors. See Barth,
supra note 2, at 212 n.45 (citing BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN RESNICI, BANK-
RuPTCY LAw MANUAL 1-2 (1980)). Therefore, some bankrupt entities must file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. See Barth, supra note 2, at 213. Chapter 11 of title
11 addresses reorganization and its applicable provisions are described in sections
1101-1174. See Bankruptcy Code § 1101-1174, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
24. See Krasnow & Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 132. If a bankrupt business
entity files for reorganization under Chapter 11, it can avoid liquidating all of its
funds. See Cahalane, supra note 5, at 269. The debtor can retain its assets while its
reorganization plan satisfies any liabilities. See id. Once the district court confirms
the submitted reorganization plan, however, the debtor is bound by its terms. See
Bankruptcy Code § 1141 (a), 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994). Other bound parties in-
clude, "any entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property
under the plan, and any creditor. .. ." Id.
12
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plan for reorganization with the district court.25 Once the plan is
approved, the debtor receives an official discharge of any pre-petition
debts not specifically covered in the plan, and may begin again with
a "fresh start. 2
6
25. See Schuh, supra note 2, at 201 (describing procedure debtor takes after
filing for bankruptcy). According to the Code's provisions,
As soon as a debtor petitions for bankruptcy, the [Bankruptcy] Code's
automatic stay provision bars creditors with 'claims' that arose prior to
the debtor's bankruptcy petition from seeking repayment outside the
bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court, using a list of 'debts'
and 'creditors' prepared by the debtor, then notifies the identified credi-
tors of their right to assert a claim against the debtor's bankruptcy estate.
Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does a Claim
Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 327, 333 (1991).
26. See Ryland, supra note 7, at 744. According to the statutory provision, a
debtor desiring reorganization "may file a plan with a petition commencing a vol-
untary case, or at any time in a voluntary case or an involuntary case." Bankruptcy
Code § 1121(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1994). The Bankruptcy Code provides
mandatory elements of a reorganization plan. See id. § 1123(a), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a). After the district court approves the plan, the debtor is granted an
automatic stay, whereby any debts or liabilities, "no matter how remote or contin-
gent," are discharged. James K. McBain, Note, Environmental Impediments to Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations, 68 IND. L.J. 233, 237 (1992) (quoting H. REP. No. 95-595, at
309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08); see also Krasnow &
Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 132 (describing automatic stay as essential provision
in chapter 11). A contingent claim is one "which would enable a person to be a
creditor in the bankruptcy action even though that person had no present cause of
action against the debtor." Reading, 115 F.3d at 1121. In In re Radio-Keith-
Orpheum (RKO) Corp., the Second Circuit addissed the existence of "contin-
gent claims" by applying section 77(b)'s broad definition of "claim." 106 F.2d 22,
26-27 (2d Cir. 1939). The RKO court reasoned that because its definition of claim
includes "claims of whatever character[,]" as long as the creditor has some interest
in the debtor's assets at the time of bankruptcy, it is irrelevant when the injury
accrues. Id. at 26. Moreover, as the Third Circuit noted in Schweitzer v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., "before one can have an 'interest' which is cognizable as a contingent
claim under section 77, one must have a legal relationship relevant to the pur-
ported interests [to] which that interest may flow." 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.
1985). In RKO, the court held that a legal relationship existed between the plain-
tiff landlord and the debtor tenant, allowing the plaintiff to sue for back-rent on
the basis of contingent claims which were not discharged at bankruptcy. See RKO,
106 F.2d at 26-27. In contrast, the Schweitzer court held'that the plaintiff did not
have a contingent claim because a legal relationship does not exist "between a
tortfeasor and tort victim until a tort has actually occurred." Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at
943 (emphasis added).
After a debtor's reorganization plan is approved, creditors are prohibited
"from commencing or continuing any actions against the entity while it undergoes
restructuring. This breathing spell afforded by the automatic stay enables manage-
ment to concentrate on rehabilitating the business and developing a proposal for
reorganization free of litigation concerns." Krasnow & Dandeneau, supra note 22,
at 132. Therefore, the automatic stay is one of the most important provisions avail-
able to debtors under chapter 11 because it insulates debtors "from debt pressures
while they negotiate a reorganization plan." Id. According to section 1141 (c)-(d),
"after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear
of all claims and interests of creditors . . .[and] the confirmation of a plan dis-
1998]
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C. The Conflict Between Competing Interests and Judicial
Responses
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code frequently conflict when
liable PRPs use the Bankruptcy Code's guaranteed discharge provi-
sion to seek protection from environmental obligations. 27 Such a
conflict is inevitable because CERCLA imposes strict liability and
the Bankruptcy Code grants a discharge of all financial debts and
liabilities. 28 Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code only discharges
pre-petition claims that are included within its statutory definition
charges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation,
and any debt of a specified kind ... ." Bankruptcy Code § 1141-(c)-(d), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(c)-(d) (1994). Nevertheless, the debtor's automatic discharge is subject to
a few exceptions. See id. § 727, 11 U.S.C. § 727.
27. SeeJohn R. Allison &John A Rizzardi, Effects of Bankruptcy on Environmental
Liabilities, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 636, 636 (1993). The conflict arises because if a PRP
is granted a discharge, CERCLA's strict liability policy is sacrificed. See Barth, supra
note 2, at 203. The guilty party escapes financial liability, and EPA is left paying
any response costs incurred. See id. Alternatively, if the discharge is refused, the
debtor cannot attain "the proverbial fresh start" the Code's provisions guarantee.
Ryland, supra note 7, at 740. In fact, some say the notion of a "fresh start" is the
"driving policy" behind the Code. Cahalane, supra note 5, at 270 (citing S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 5793). Nevertheless,
although many bankrupt entities seek shelter from environmental liabilities under
the Code, bankruptcy law provides for only a limited degree of liability. See Ryland,
supra note 7, at 740. For example, only those unsecured claims arising pre-petition
"whether or not creditors seek payment" will be discharged. Krasnow &
Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 133-34.
28. See Kratzke, supra note 14, at 387. Although CERCLA's language does not
specify that parties are to be held strictly liable under its provisions, courts inter-
preting the statute have agreed that it imposes strict liability. See True, supra note
3, at 333. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 175
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (applying standard of strict liability to CERCLA, while still includ-
ing certain affirmative defenses); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893
(E.D.N.C. 1985) (stating "CERCLA imposes strict liability"); In reT.P. Long Chem.,
Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 282 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (stating section 107(a) of CERCLA ex-
presses strict liability standard); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting although CERCLA's lan-
guage does not specifically provide for strict liability, courts interpret CERCLA as
strict liability statute), aff'd 810 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding CERCLA imposes strict liability on PRPs). Courts have also construed
this liability as retroactive. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989)
(dismissing argument CERCLA cannot be applied retroactively), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1071 (1990); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (holding CERLCA is retroactive in nature, as Congress intended);
Northeastern Pharm., 810 F.2d, at 732 (affirming district court decision that CER-
CLA is retroactive statute); State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1300
(N.D. Ohio 1983) (stating CERCLA does not fall "within 'remedial' exception to
presumption against retroactive application .. ."). For more information on CER-
CLA as a strict liability statute, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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of "claim." 29 As a result, debtors and EPA disagree over two con-
trolling issues: (1) whether environmental obligations can be dis-
charged as "claims" under the Bankruptcy Code; and if they can,
(2) when environmental claims accrue for discharge purposes.30
29. See Green, supra note 9, at 174; TAX CONSEQUENCES 2 NORTON BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 2D § 41:10 (1993) [hereinafter NORTON]. It has been noted that "[c]entral
to the reorganization process, and consistent with the notion of a 'fresh start,' is
the rule that liability for all claims against the debtor existing on the date a plan of
reorganization is confirmed by the court.., are discharged." Krasnow & Dandeneau,
supra note 22, at 133-34 (citing Bankruptcy Code § 1141(d), 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)
(1994)) (emphasis added).
30. See Krasnow & Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 133-34 (noting "[tihe pri-
mary battleground in this apparent clash of competing policies is the scope of the
discharge of claims in bankruptcy"). Debtors argue for a broad interpretation of
the word "claim," asserting that any environmental liabilities arising pre-petition
satisfy the definition for discharge purposes. See id. at 134. If courts use this broad
definition, it is guaranteed that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be discharged with in [sic] the bankruptcy case." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1978).
EPA, conversely, asserts a more narrow reading of "claim." It argues that envi-
ronmental claims should not be discharged unless the government has actually
expended funds cleaning up an environmental disaster. See Krasnow &
Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 134. EPA elected this position because "[a] late trig-
ger date allows the government [and EPA] to argue that the debtor's liability...
does not arise until after the plan of reorganization has been confirmed, and thus
... claims for reimbursement ... pass through the bankruptcy to the reorganized
entity without being discharged." Id. The Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as
follows:
(A) [R]ight to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;
or
(B) [the] right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance of
such breach gives rise to a right of payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.
Bankruptcy Code § 101(5), 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994). Although the Bankruptcy
Code's definition is fairly broad, the obligation must fall within one of five catego-
ries listed to qualify as a "claim." See McBain, supra note 26, at 241. Those catego-
ries are "secured claims, administrative expenses, priority claims (such as tax
claims held by government units), unsecured claims, or equity interests." Id. Most
courts have classified "environmental obligations" as either "administrative ex-
penses or unsecured claims." Id. at 242; see In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R.
397, 413 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (characterizing post-petition CERCLA response
costs as administrative priority expenses).
In contrast, CERCLA defines a "claim" as "a demand in writing for a sum
certain." CERCLA § 101(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(4)(1994). Although the statutes'
definitions of "claim" differ, courts have looked to legislative intent and deter-
mined both statutes demand a broad interpretation of the term. See Ohio v. Ko-
vacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279-83 (1985) (discussing Congress's intention that "claim" be
construed broadly); Kratzke, supra note 14, at 388 (noting Kovacs court's broad
interpretation of "claim" as used in Bankruptcy Code). Thus, legislative intent has
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These issues resulted because the Bankruptcy Code does not specify
whether environmental liabilities can be characterized as "claims"
under its discharge policy.31 As a result, courts have been forced to
decide the issue on a case-by-case basis in their collective search for
a practical balance between the two statutes.3 2
The definition in [the Bankruptcy Code] adopts an even broader defini-
tion of claim than is found in the present debtor rehabilitation chapters.
The definition [of claim] is any right to payment, whether or not reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. The
definition also includes as a claim an equitable right to performance that
does not give rise to a right to payment. By this broadest definition and
by use of the term throughout title 11, especially subchapter I of chapter
5, the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 22 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5807-
08. Consequently, by broadening the definition of "claim" in the revised version of
the Bankruptcy Code, Congress effectively increased the number of debtors who
could seek the safety of the "fresh start" policy. Cahalane, supra note 5, at 270; see
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5793 (noting Bankruptcy
Code's discharge provisions are at center of fresh start policy).
Moreover, CERCLA also implies an expansive definition of "claim" because
the statute's primary goal is to guarantee that PRPs address the environmental
"claims" against them. See Kratzke, supra note 14, at 385. As Congress addressed a
serious and extensive problem in enacting CERCLA, the only way to assure the
statute's success was to assign the term "claim" an expansive connotation. Id. at
384-85.
31. See McBain, supra note 26, at 234. The Bankruptcy Code excluded envi-
ronmental obligations from its provisions primarily because environmental con-
cerns did not reach public awareness until years after the Bankruptcy Code was
revised. See id. The absence of environmental claims from the Code does not nec-
essarily mean it affords them preferential treatment or priority. See Parker, supra
note 13, at 227. As a result, courts must decide "whether environmental obliga-
tions are 'claims' in bankruptcy, and if so, what kind of priority they should have
[if any]." McBain, supra note 26, at 234.
32. Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental
Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 85, 90 (1994-95). For the most part,
federal courts are divided on which of the two statutes, if either, should
predominate. See Kratzke, supra note 14, at 387. There are numerous reasons why
courts are so divided on this issue. These may include:
(1) the difficulty of reconciling the fresh start purpose of bankruptcy
with the cleanup and liability objectives of CERCLA;
(2) the practical difficulty of pinpointing the moment potential CERCLA
claims arise given the complexities, various phases, and uncertainties
of environmental liability; and
(3) a judicial concern that reorganization not be used as a tool for com-
panies to escape legitimate environmental liabilities.
Kahn, supra note 2, at 2033.
Still, not all courts believe one statute should actually prevail over the other.
See National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 404. The Gypsum court stated that "it is not a
question of which statute should be accorded primacy over the other, but rather
what interaction between [the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA] serves most faith-
fully the policy objectives embodied in the two separate enactments of Congress."
Id. Therefore, only some courts accommodate the statutes' competing interests.
16
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The Supreme Court first addressed the dischargeability of envi-
ronmental obligations in Ohio v. Kovacs. 33 The Court applied the
Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of "claim" and held that envi-
ronmental obligations may be characterized as "claims" for bank-
ruptcy purposes.34 Federal courts have used Kovacs as a foundation,
For a discussion of how courts resolve this conflict, see Krasnow & Dandeneau,
supra note 22, at 135-36.
33. 469 U.S. 274, 275 (1985). Kovacs has been described as "t]he seminal
case on the dischargeability of claims based on environmental damages." ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAWS, 6A NORTON BANKRt. L. & PRAc. 21 § 149:22 (1997) [hereinafter ENvi-
RONMENTAL LAWS]. In Kovacs, the district court granted the State of Ohio an
injunction against Kovacs and other entities, ordering them to clean up a waste site
that was under their group control. See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 275. After one defend-
ant refused to comply with the injunction, the Court issued a lien on his personal
belongings to satisfy the cost of the cleanup. See id. at 276. The defendant, how-
ever, declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy before the state took possession of all his
assets, and was therefore granted relief from any future expenses or obligations.
See id. & n.1.
The State of Ohio petitioned the Bankruptcy Court, arguing that the defend-
ant's environmental obligation was not discharged at bankruptcy because it did
not constitute a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 275. Both the Bank-
ruptcy Court and the district court held in favor of the defendant. See id. at 276-77.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating "we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for con-
cluding that the cleanup order had been converted into an obligation to pay
money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy." Id. at 283. The
Supreme Court "granted certiorari to determine the dischargeablity of [the de-
fendant's] obligation under the affirmative injunction entered against him." Id. at
277. The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, stating "[a]s we understand it, the
Court of Appeals held that, in the circumstances, the cleanup duty had been re-
duced to a monetary obligation. We do not disturb this judgment...." Id. at 282-
83.
34. See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279. The Court analyzed both the language as well
as the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and determined that Congress
intended a broad interpretation of "claim." See id. at 278-79. Accordingly, the
Court held that because Ohio deserved "an equitable remedy" and its injunction
against Kovacs was a financial obligation, it qualified as a dischargeable claim
under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 278-79, 283. In essence, the Court interpreted
.claim" "to include any obligation of the debtor convertible into a monetary obliga-
tion." Schuh, supra note 2, at 204 (citing Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 278-79). But see
Torwico Elec., Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding exercise of regulatory law, though requiring expenditure of
money, is not bankruptcy "claim"). Kovacs helped to reaffirm the Bankruptcy
Code's "fresh start" policy by broadening its scope to cover environmental obliga-
tions. See Kratzke, supra note 14, at 388 (citing Ellen E. Sward, Note, Resolving
Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 403, 428
(1987)).
Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's decision in Kovacs, she
included a separate, concurring opinion. See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285-86
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor focused on the policy considera-
tions supporting the discharge of environmental obligations, hoping to dismiss
Ohio's fears that the Kovacs decision would prevent a state from enforcing environ-
mental laws altogether. See id. at 286. Justice O'Connor declared that a state is not
left without recourse, asserting that "a state may protect its interest in the enforce-
ment of its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory
liens or secured claims." Id.
1998]
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and agree that environmental obligations under CERCLA fall
within the reach of the Bankruptcy Code's discharge provisions.3 5
Nevertheless, these courts have been forced to delve deeper into
their analysis because "[a]lthough the [Supreme] Court held that
liability for environmental cleanup may be discharged, it did not
settle when liability under various environmental statutes, most im-
portantly CERCLA, becomes a bankruptcy 'claim.'"36 As a result,
circuit courts are presently divided on the issue and have conse-
quently failed to give either debtors or EPA any consistent guidance
for the resolution of future claims.3 7
Circuit courts have taken different approaches in answering
this question, and as a result, four basic theories have arisen: (1)
the debtor's conduct test; (2) the pro-creditor expenditure of re-
sponse costs test; (3) the fair contemplation test; and (4) the legal
relationship test.3 8 The Second Circuit was the first court to ad-
35. See Cahalane, supra note 5, at 270-72 & n.60 (discussing how Kovacs au-
thorized application of Bankruptcy Code's discharge provision to CERC[A
claims); Krasnow & Dandeneau, supra note 22, at 138 (discussing how various
courts have interpreted Kovacs). Since 1991, many courts have addressed the issue
of discharging CERCLA liability at bankruptcy, and the trend shows courts' willing-
ness to discharge all CERCLA liability under appropriate circumstances. See Shawn
F. Sullivan, Note, Discharge of CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: The Necessity for a Uni-
form Position, 17 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 445, 467 (1993). But see In re Allegheny Int'l
Inc., 126 B.R. 919, 921-22 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding it is difficult to dis-
charge all potential CERCLA liability because discharge depends upon creditor's
action, regardless of notice requirement), affd 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1991).
36. Saville, supra note 25, at 328 (emphasis added).
37. See Allison & Rizzardi, supra note 27, 644-45 (noting divisions between
different courts over when "an environmental liability claim arises for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code"); True, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing "split" between
courts over when environmental claim accrues for bankruptcy purposes); Schuh,
supra note 2, at 220-21 (noting conflicting policies of different courts over when
CERCLA claims arise for bankruptcy purposes). Although courts are divided, they
universally agree that timing is especially crucial in bankruptcy cases. See Kratzke,
supra note 14, at 388. Cases involving environmental debts and liabilities are no
exception to this rule. See id. at 388-89.
38. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAws, supra note 33, § 149:22. Two additional theo-
ries have been proposed. First, one author postulated his own theory of "for-
seeability" as a solution to the judicial uncertainty over when CERCLA obligations
accrue for discharge purposes. See Saville, supra note 25, at 354. According to the
foreseeability theory, "courts should discharge only the CERCLA liability which is
or was foreseeable at the conclusion of the debtor's bankruptcy case." Id. For dis-
cussion of foreseeability theory, see id. at 354-361. The Seventh Circuit advocated
a second theory entitled "running with the land." Schuh, supra note 2, at 213-14
(citing In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992)). The
CMC Heartland court "held that liability under CERCLA, based on a debtor's cur-
rent ownership of the hazardous waste site, is a claim running with the land, and
therefore, survives chapter 11 reorganization." CMC Heartland, 966 F.2d at 1146.
The CMC Heartland court noted that "[b]y authorizing the President to direct the
current owner to cleanup a dump, CERCLA creates a claim running with the
land." Id. at 1146.
18
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dress the question left unanswered by the Kovacs decision.39 In In re
Chateaugay Corp., the court held that EPA's pre-petition response
costs constituted dischargeable "claims" under the Bankruptcy
Code "regardless of when such costs were incurred, so long as such
costs concerned release or threatened release of hazardous waste that occurred
before debtor filed his Chapter 11 petition .... -40 The Second Circuit
agreed with the district court's approach and focused on the exact
moment the hazardous release or threatened release occurred,
rather than on when EPA expended its cleanup costs. 41 The ap-
39. See True, supra note 3, at 339. The Second Circuit addressed the dis-
chargeability of environmental obligations at bankruptcy and focused on when en-
vironmental claims accrued for bankruptcy purposes. See In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1991). In Chateaugay, LTV Corporation declared
Chapter 11 bankruptcy while EPA was in the process of cleaning up contaminated
waste sites LTV created. See id. at 999. LTV acknowledged its potential liability and
included the contingent claims "held by EPA and the environmental enforcement
officers of all fifty states and the District of Columbia" in its plan for reorganiza-
tion. Id. LTV was liable to EPA for approximately $32 million of pre-petition re-
sponse costs, an amount EPA believed to be only a fraction of what LTV would
eventually owe. See id. EPA therefore argued against the discharge of any future
costs which it could incur in the future on the basis that the release or threatened
release occurred pre-petition. See id. at 1000. The district court interpreted the
word "claim" broadly and ruled in favor of LTV's discharge. See id. The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's pro-debtor decision. See id. at 1010. Rather
than trying to balance the competing objectives of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code, the court ruled in favor of the latter. See id. at 1002. Illustrating its pro-
debtor bias, the Second Circuit stated:
Cleaning up the environment will not necessarily be aided by agreeing
with the agencies that they do not yet have "claims." A determination
that the CERCLA response costs ultimately to be incurred are not now
claims might impair the prospects of achieving a viable reorganization,
with the result that the debtor, instead of reorganizing, liquidates under
Chapter 7 or dissolves . . . and the assets . . . are either unavailable for
environmental cleanup costs . . . or available only to the limited extent
that such costs are considered unaccrued claims ....
Id. at 1002.
40. Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added). LTV focused on its pre-petition actions
and argued that the federal government's claims against it accrued for bankruptcy
purposes the moment LTV violated CERCLA, not when EPA acquired response
costs. See id. at 1000. The federal government alternatively asserted that the time
of the debtor's actions is irrelevant. See id. at 1001. The government argued that a
CERCLA claim does not accrue until after EPA expends money on cleanup costs.
See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 32, at 95 (citing Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 997).
Therefore, only those EPA funds spent pre-petition are dischargeable. See Chateau-
gay, 944 F.2d at 1000. The federal government relied on the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., "which held that a prepetition act by a
debtor giving rise to a later liability is not enough to bring an action within the
definition of a 'claim.'" Spracker & Barnette, supra note 32, at 95 (emphasis ad-
ded) (citing Avellino & Bienes v. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984)).
41. See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1000. The Second Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that "an obligation to reimburse EPA for response costs is a dischargea-
ble claim whenever based upon a pre-petition release or threatened release of
hazardous substances. This ruling covers releases that have occurred pre-petition,
1998]
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proach the Second Circuit adopted is called the "debtor's-conduct
test."42
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In reJensen
followed a similar pro-debtor approach to that of Chateaugay.43 The
panel focused on a claim issue and rejected an environmental
even though they have not then been discovered by EPA [or anyone else]." Id. See
Spracker & Barnette, supra note 32, at 95-96 (stating "[t]he Second Circuit held in
Chateaugay that a CERCLA claim arises at the time of the 'release or threatened
release' of hazardous substances") (citing Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002-06). Ac-
cording to the Chateaugay court, even though EPA may not learn about or expend
response costs on an environmental disaster until after LTV declares bankruptcy,
the claims existed pre-petition as contingent claims. See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at
1005. The court stated:
True, EPA does not yet know the full extent of the hazardous waste re-
moval costs that it may one day incur and seek to impose upon LTV, and
it does not yet even know the location of all the sites at which such wastes
may yet be found. But the location of these sites, the determination of
their coverage by CERCLA, and the incurring of response costs by EPA
are all steps that may fairly be viewed. . . as rendering EPA's claim "con-
tingent" rather than as placing it outside the Code's definition of "claim."
Id. The Second Circuit also rejected the federal government's argument that a
narrow reading of "claim" would help further the environmental interests Con-
gress sought to protect with CERCLA. See id. at 1002. The court insisted that if
Congress wanted an exception in the discharge provision for environmental obli-
gations, it would have included the necessary provisions itself. See id. Further-
more, the Chateaugay court acknowledged that the judicial system does not have
the authority "to restrict the meaning of across-the-board legislation like a bank-
ruptcy law in order to promote objectives evident in [a] more focused statute[
[like CERCLA]." Id.
42. Kahn, supra note 2, at 2012. Although only a minority of courts follow the
"debtor's-conduct test," several have followed its reasoning when confronted with
similar issues. See NORTON, supra note 29, at § 149:22. See, e.g., Gull Indus. v.John
Mitchell, Inc. (In re Hanna), 168 B.R. 386 (B.A.P. 1994); In re Torwico, 8 F.3d 146
(3d Cir. 1993); CMC Heartland, 966 F.2d at 1143; Texaco Inc. v. Sanders (In re
Texaco Inc.), 182 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
43. See In ReJensen, 127 B.R. 27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), affd, 995 F.2d 925
(9th Cir. 1993). Commentators have also referred to the Jensen court's approach
as the "underlying act" approach. Saville, supra note 25, at 341-42. In Jensen, the
debtor's corporation owned and operated a lumber mill in California for a brief
period. SeeJensen, 995 F.2d at 926. The mill went out of business in December
1983 and the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December of that same
year. See id. Less than two months later, the California Water Board notified the
debtor that the existence of a chemical hazard on the land where the mill once
operated created the possibility of an environmental catastrophe. See id. The
debtor corporation refused to take the necessary actions to remedy the hazard,
claiming a lack of financial resources, and the Board sought assistance of the Cali-
fornia Department of Human Services (DHS) in undertaking cleanup measures.
See id. at 927. DHS then notified the Jensens as PRPs, and assessed them ten per-
cent of the expenses. See id. On April 24, 1989, the Jensens "sought a determina-
tion that their pro rata share of the cleanup expenses had been 'discharged, by the
granting of the discharge to the debtors . . . on July 23, 1984.'" Id. The bank-
ruptcy court ruled in favor of the State of California and held that the claims were
not discharged when the debtors filed for bankruptcy. See id. The bankruptcy
appellate court reversed the holding, and the state appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
See id.
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agency's argument that its claim against the Jensens did not accrue
until the agency expended funds on the cleanup. 44 The bank-
ruptcy panel held instead that the claim accrued once the "liability-
creating conduct" occurred. 45 Therefore, once the debtor per-
formed the threatening conduct leading to its liability under CER-
CLA, a dischargeable claim existed. 46  In Jensen, because the
contamination occurred before the Jensens filed for bankruptcy,
the claims were effectively discharged at bankruptcy.47
The court in In re National Gypsum Co. 48 relied upon the
Chateaugay analysis, but took that analysis one step further.49 The
44. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 478 (citing In reJensen, 127 B.R. at 30-31).
According to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit, "a determina-
tion that a claim under environmental laws arises when funds are expended con-
travenes the overriding goal of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a fresh start for the
debtor." ENVIRONMENTAL LAws, supra note 33, at § 149:22.
45. Sullivan, supra note 35, at 478 (citing Jensen, 127 B.R. at 30-31, and deter-
mining when claim accrued for bankruptcy purposes).
46. SeeJensen, 127 B.R. at 32 (stating "[t]he final theory, that the bankruptcy
claim arises based upon the debtor's conduct, we believe most closely reflects legis-
lative intent and finds the most support in the case law"); see also Kratzke, supra
note 14, at 399 (discussing when dischargeable claim arises).
47. SeeJensen, 127 B.R. at 33. In essence, the Appellate Panel only required
that the release, or threatened release, occurred pre-petition for it to be dis-
charged at bankruptcy. See id. The Panel adopted the rationale the Chateaugay
court used, and stated that "so long as a prepetition triggering event has occurred,
i.e. the release or threatened release of hazardous waste, the claim is dischargea-
ble, regardless of when the claim for relief may be in all respects ripe for adjudica-
tion." Id. at 32 (citing Chateaugay, 112 B.R. at 522). Other courts' holdings are
consistent with Jensen, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel stated that "[t]hese
cases have generally held the bankruptcy claim arises upon conduct by the debtor
which would give rise to a cause of action, if other elements may later be satisfied."
Id. See, e.g., In reJohns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 684 (B.A.P. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding "damages arising because of pre-petition events" create claims for bank-
ruptcy purposes); In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986, 994 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986)
(stating "right to payment arises when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability
were performed"), affid, Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988); In
re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (stating plaintiff has "right to
payment and thus a claim arose at the time of the debtor's pre-petition
misconduct").
48. 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
49. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 482. The National Gypsum Co. declared
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 28, 1990. See Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 399. Upon
declaring bankruptcy, Gypsum alerted the United States that they may be liable for
environmental hazards at multiple Superfund sites. See id. at 401. Almost one year
later, on May 29, 1991, the United States filed a CERCLA claim against the debtor
corporation, alleging that Gypsum was responsible for generating and dumping
hazardous waste in seven different Superfund locations. See id. at 401. In the
claim, the United States also reserved the right to file additional CERCLA claims
against Gypsum for pre-petition disposals at thirteen unlisted sites. See id. The
United States was also aware of other Superfund sites Gypsum was partly responsi-
ble for creating. See id. at 403.
The United States made several arguments in its claim. First, it argued that
any future response costs EPA incurred were not subject to the Code's guaranteed
1998]
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Gypsum court refused to favor one statute over the other, and at-
tempted to strike a balance between the Bankruptcy Code and
CERCLA. 50 Similar to the Second Circuit's decision in Chateaugay,
the Gypsum court agreed that for discharge purposes, a CERCLA
claim accrues at the point of release or threatened release of the
hazardous material because of pre-petition conduct.51 Thus, in ad-
discharge of claims. See id. at 401. Second, the United States argued that any costs
associated with the thirteen unlisted sites were not dischargeable bankruptcy
claims. See id. The United States also claimed that any future response costs EPA
incurred should be awarded administrative priority. See id. Lastly, the United
Stated wanted to hold Gypsum and its parent corporation jointly and severally lia-
ble for the CERCLA claims. See id.
In response, Gypsum filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
"potential liability for any future response costs or future natural resource damages
at the seven Listed Sites constitute pre-petition claims subject to discharge. . . .
Id. The debtor corporations also argued that any environmental obligations "pre-
petition conduct" caused were claims subject to the Code's discharge provision
and any EPA costs incurred were unsecured claims not provided for in Gypsum's
reorganization plan. See id. Lastly, Gypsum opposed joint and several liability, and
argued that its obligation should be assessed according to it actual participation in
creating the waste site. See id.
The bankruptcy court addressed four issues at trial. The first was "whether
future response costs ... at the Listed Sites are 'claims' within the meaning of the
Code, and subject to discharge." Id. at 403. The second was "whether Debtors'
environmental liabilities for the Unlisted Sites arising from pre-petition conduct
are 'claims' within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to discharge." Id.
at 409. The third was whether EPA's response costs "are entitled to administrative
expense priority." Id. at 412. Lastly, the fourth issue was whether Gypsum and its
parent corporation werejointly and severally liable. See id. at 413. For purposes of
this Note, only the first two of the four issues stated are significant.
50. See Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 404. The Gypsum court stated:
Once a potentially responsible party is in bankruptcy, the provisions of CER-
CLA cannot stand as the sole relevant statutory guide, and must be reconciled with
the provisions of the Code. Contrary to the... party's respective arguments,
it is not a question of which statute should be accorded primacy over the
other, but rather what interaction between the two statutes serves most
faithfully the policy objectives embodied in the two separate enactments
of Congress.
Id. (emphasis added). See also In re Cottonwood Canyon Land Co., 146 B.R. 992,
997 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting petitioner's argument environmental claims
deserved special treatment under Code). But see United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d
147, 150 (6th Cir. 1988) (reflecting inability to reconcile competing interests of
both statutes and ultimately favoring environmental obligations over "fresh start").
51. See Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407. The Gypsum court agreed with Chateaugay
that "conduct giving rise to release or threatened release of hazardous substances
pre-petition should be the relevant inquiry in determining the existence of a claim
in bankruptcy. . . ." Id. The Gypsum court's analysis did not stop there in that it
refused to favor the Bankruptcy Code's policies over those of CERCLA. See id.
This approach is consistent with Congress's primary goal that all creditors are as-
sured "equal and identical treatment... , thus preventing any creditor from re-
ceiving preferential treatment." Parker, supra note 13, at 227. The court failed to
see any "meaningful distinction" between the time of release or the time of the
debtor's conduct. Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407. Rather, the Gypsum court held:
[T]he only meaningful distinction that can be made regarding CERCLA
claims in bankruptcy is one that distinguishes between costs associated
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dition to essentially adopting the debtor's conduct test, the Gypsum
court articulated the idea of "fair contemplation. '52 According to
the fair contemplation analysis, the discharge of an environmental
obligation at bankruptcy requires that two elements are first satis-
fied. First, the release or threatened release must have occurred
based upon pre-petition conduct. Second, future response costs
must have been within the "fair contemplation" of the government
or EPA at the time of bankruptcy.53 Therefore, according to the
Gypsum court, "[i]t is immaterial for the purposes of bankruptcy,
whether EPA's claims against the Debtors are ripe for adjudication
under CERCLA, as long as all the elements that can give rise to
liability under CERCLA have occurred pre-petition. ''54
In contrast, United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal55 is a pri-
mary example of a case in which a court followed a more pro-credi-
tor approach to the discharge of environmental obligations by
focusing on the legal relationship between the parties.5 6 The Union
with pre-petition conduct resulting in a release or threat of release that
could have been "fairly" contemplated by the parties; and those that could not
have been "fairly" contemplated by the parties.
Id. at 407-08 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 408-09.
53. See id. To determine whether the fair contemplation of future response
costs was present, the Gypsum court listed several relevant factors to identify. See id.
at 408. Those factors include "knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP
may be liable, NPL listing, notification by EPA of PRP liability, commencement of
investigation and cleanup activities, and incurrence of response costs." Id. In Gyp-
sum, the court applied the fair contemplation standard to the listed claims, and
held that at least one, if not all, of the enumerated factors existed at bankruptcy.
See id. Therefore, all of the claims against Gypsum existed and were effectively
discharged at bankruptcy. See id. at 415. The court held that "[a]ll liability at the
Unlisted Sites arising from pre-petition conduct resulting in release or threatened
release, fairly within contemplation of the parties, are dischargeable claims." Id. at
412.
54. Id. at 405. Other courts have adopted similar approaches to the one the
Gypsum court used. See, e.g., In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. 738, 745 (E.D. Pa
1995) (noting bankruptcy discharge depends on presence of all CERCLA elements
pre-petition), affid 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Texaco, 182 B.R. 937, 949
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (asserting Code only requires that claims arise before reor-
ganization plan is confirmed to be discharged at bankruptcy).
55. 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
56. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAws, supra note 33, § 149:22. In Union Scrap, the
debtor corporation Taracorp was involved in the contamination of several
Superfund sites, and it notified EPA of its involvement upon filing Chapter 11
bankruptcy on October 1, 1982. See Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 833. Five years after
Taracorp successfully emerged from bankruptcy, EPA brought a CERCLA claim
against it. See id. at 833-34. Taracorp sought protection from the Code's discharge
provision, arguing that any CERCLA liability was discharged because the hazard-
ous release occurred pre-petition. See id. at 834. EPA conversely argued that
Taracorp's CERCLA liabilities did not accrue for discharge purposes until "after its
reorganization had been confirmed by the bankruptcy court." Id. Accordingly,
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Scrap court refused to broadly define "claim" and instead stated that
"nonbankruptcy substantive law defines when a particular relation-
ship between a debtor and a third party amounts to a legal obliga-
tion reflecting a claim for bankruptcy purposes."57 The Union Scrap
court therefore used CERCLA instead of the Bankruptcy Code to
determine when a legal obligation was established between the
debtor and EPA.58 The court relied on the government's argument
that EPA's potential to imagine the existence of environmental
hazards at the debtor's facilities did "not give rise to a presumption
of knowledge of the hazards . . . -59 Accordingly, the court held
that a legal obligation under CERCLA is not established until after
EPA incurs cleanup costs because it is only then that EPA knows
about the hazard.60 The fact that the debtor in Union Scrap per-
formed the liable conduct pre-petition was not enough. 61 There-
fore, Union Scrap defined a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes on the
basis of the existence of a legal relationship between the parties. 62
the Union Scrap court considered the following question: "Should a party's liabili-
ties for environmental damage be discharged in bankruptcy when the harm was
done pre-petition, but it was not known at the time to the EPA that the party was
potentially responsible, and when CERCLA liability could not be incurred until
after bankruptcy reorganization was complete?" Id. at 835.
57. Id.
58. See id. For a listing of the elements necessary to impose CERCLA liability,
see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 836.
60. See id. at 835-36. Taracorp urged the Union Scrap court to follow the
Chateaugay precedent and "hold that the mere release or threatened release of
hazardous substances, without actual or presumed knowledge resulting in discov-
ery, investigation, response or the incurring of costs [on the part of EPA], should
be considered a contingent claim dischargeable in bankruptcy." Id. at 836-37. The
court rejected Taracorp's argument, stating that "[a]dopting Taracorp's position
would effectively require pre-enforcement CERCLA litigation by forcing the EPA
to investigate and assess its potential CERCLA claims every time a conceivable po-
tentially responsible party filed for bankruptcy. This would reverse the CERCLA
scheme and threaten the effectiveness of EPA action." Id. at 837. See also, In re
Combustion Equipment Ass'n., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating "[i]f
the EPA is forced to expend its resources on preserving its rights to eventual recov-
ery against any PRP... the EPA will have less ability to pursue its primary mission
....."). The Union Scrap court instead chose to follow a more "sensible approach"
which balanced the interests of both statutes. Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 838. Follow-
ing the precedent established in Jensen, the Union Scrap court held that a legal
relationship is not established between the parties until EPA incurs expenses. See
id. at 837-38.
61. See id.
62. See Robin E. Phelan, et al., Contamination of the "Fresh Start".- When the Costs
of Environmental Cleanup Are Not Dischargeable Claims, (28-June) BULL. Bus. L. SEC.
ST. B. TEX. 52, 60 (1991); see also ENVRIONMENTAL LAws, supra note 33, § 149:22
(referring to Union Scrap's approach as "response costs" view which applied Jensen
reasoning). The Union Scrap court based its holding on the principle that "[a]
claim exists only when the pre-bankruptcy relationship between the debtor and
24
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The Third Circuit adheres to the legal relationship approach
defined in Union Scrap.63 The first significant Third Circuit case
addressing the conflict between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
was Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.64 In Schweitzer, the Reading
Company invoked the Bankruptcy Code's discharge provision
against company employees who sued the railroad for asbestos-re-
lated injuries after it had already reorganized. 65 Reading argued
that the claims were discharged at bankruptcy because the employ-
ees' exposure occurred before the railroad reorganized. 66 The
third party contained all the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation
under the relevant substantive non-bankruptcy law." Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835.
Accordingly, because EPA had not yet incurred any cleanup expenses, no legal
relationship was established between the parties pre-petition. See Phelan, et al.,
supra, at 60. The court denied Taracorp's motion for summary judgment because
it failed to establish that EPA had a contingent claim at bankruptcy. See Union
Scrap, 123 B.R. at 839. See generally In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108 (W.D. Tex. 1994); In
re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1988).
63. See Parker, supra note 13, at 231-32.
64. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985). The primary issue before the Third Circuit
on appeal was "whether a plaintiff in an asbestos-related personal injury action who
had no manifest injury prior to the consummation date of his employer's reorgani-
zation in bankruptcy had a dischargeable 'claim' within the meaning of [the
Code]." Id. at 939.
65. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1121. Reading invoked section 77(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act for its defense. See id. According to Bankruptcy Code section 205,
which replaced Bankruptcy Act section 77, all creditors are bound by the reorgani-
zation plan, regardless of whether they file any claims against the bankrupt com-
pany pre-petition. See Bankruptcy Code § 205(f), 11 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1976)
(repealed 1978). The Bankruptcy Code specifically provides:
[U]pon confirmation by the judge, the provisions of the plan and of the
order of confirmation shall.., be binding upon the debtor, all stockhold-
ers thereof, including those who have not, as well as those who have, ac-
cepted it, and all creditors secured or unsecured, whether or not
adversely affected by the plan, and whether or not their claims shall have
been filed, and, if filed, whether or not approved, including creditors
who have not, as well as those who have, accepted it.
Id. The statute further provides:
[Tilhe property dealt with by the plan, when transferred and conveyed to
the debtor or to the other corporation or corporations provided for by
the plan, or when retained by the debtor pursuant to the plan, shall be
free and clear of all claims of the debtor, its stockholders and creditors,
and the debtor shall be discharged from its debts and liabilities ....
Id. This language illustrates congressional intent to grant bankrupt companies a
fresh start, free of any prior debts or claims against them. See id. Still, the Schweitzer
court recognized that the "plaintiffs' fights could only have been affected by the
discharge of all 'claims' against their employer if they had 'claims' within the
meaning of § 77 prior to the consummation date of their employer's reorganiza-
tion." Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 941. Section 77 defines "claims" as interests including
"debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities (other than stock and option
warrants to subscribe to stock), liens, or other interests of whatever character."
Bankruptcy Code § 205(b), 11 US.C. § 205(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
66. See Schweitzer, 758 F.3d at 941-42. The employees based their argument on
traditional tort theory which states that there is generally no cause of action until
1998]
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Third Circuit rejected this argument, asserting that mere exposure
to asbestos was not enough to establish a claim. 67 The court stated
that no dischargeable claim existed prior to injury because "there
was no legal relationship between the parties" until after an actual
injury occurred. 68 Relying on federal tort law, the Schweitzer court
determined that because the employees suffered no compensable
injury prior to Reading's reorganization, no claim existed at that
point either.69 Therefore, because no legal relationship existed be-
tween the parties until after Reading reorganized, such claims did
not accrue until post-petition. 70 Thus, the employees' claims were
not discharged at bankruptcy.71 As such, under the Schweitzer ex-
ception to bankruptcy discharges, a claim not existing prior to reor-
ganization cannot be discharged by section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act.72
the plaintiff suffers some compensable injury. See id. at 942. The court referenced
a treatise on tort law that explains:
Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another [is a necessary
element of a negligence cause of action] .... The threat of future harm,
not yet realized, is not enough. Negligent conduct in itself is not such an
interference . . . except in the case of some individual whose interests
have suffered.
W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 165 (5th ed. 1984).
67. See Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 942. The court feared that "[i]f mere exposure
to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to a... cause of action, countless seemingly
healthy railroad workers, workers who might never manifest injury, would have tort
claims .... " Id. As a result, the court held that the claim required some manifest
injury. See id.
68. Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 167-68.
69. See id. at 943.
70. See id. (stating "before one can have an 'interest' which is cognizable as a
contingent claim under section 77, one must have a legal relationship relevant to
the purported interest from which that interest may flow"); see also Danzig Claim-
ants v. Grynberg (In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (hold-
ing "some direct prepetition privity" between parties is necessary for contingent
claim); In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 933-34 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (necessi-
tating pre-petition relationship between parties for discharge purposes); cf.
Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336-37 (holding contingent claim does not exist unless there
is right to payment).
71. See Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336-37; see also In re Central R.R Co. of NewJersey,
950 F.2d 887, 892 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding manifest injury is necessary requirement
of claim and therefore, "a claim is not manifest until the claimant discovers, or a
reasonable person would have discovered, his injury and knows or has reason to
know, the cause thereof"); Zulkowski v. Consol. Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding tort action constitutes claim under Bankruptcy Act, but does not
accrue until "a party suffers an identifiable, compensable injury"); cf Frenville, 744
F.2d at 335 (applying rule established in Schweitzer and holding "[o]nly proceed-
ings that could have been commenced or claims that arose before filing of the
bankruptcy petitions are automatically stayed").
72. See Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 943.
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The Third Circuit has followed Schweitzer in a number of bank-
ruptcy cases. In In re Penn Central Transp. Co. (Pinney Dock),73 the
Third Circuit discharged the plaintiff's anti-trust claim against the
reorganized Penn Central Corporation (PCC) because every essen-
tial element of an anti-trust claim was present before Penn Central
Transportation Company (PCTC) reorganized. 74  Therefore, a
73. 771 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1985). In Pinney Dock, Penn Central Transportation
Company (PCTC) sought reorganization under section 77. See id. at 763. The dis-
trict court ordered that any of PCTC's creditors wanting to protect their claims
from automatic discharge had to come forward and produce definitive evidence of
any existing claims "against PCTC arising prior to the date of the reorganization pro-
cess .... Id. (emphasis added). The creditor corporations received written notice
from the district court and filed timely claims against the bankrupt railroad. See id.
The creditors filed claims, however, not "based upon alleged antitrust violations."
Id. at 764. The district court approved the plan, and ordered its consummation
date for October 24, 1978. See id.
The Consummation Order finalized the reorganization process, ordering a
discharge of any claims not already raised. See id. "Notwithstanding the discharge
and injunctive provisions of Section 77(f) and the Consummation Order .... [the
creditors later] filed actions ... alleging violations of antitrust laws by PCC [Penn
Central Corporation], its predecessor railroad companies, and five other rail-
roads." Id. at 765. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court partially granted their request. See id. at 766. The court granted summary
judgment concerning the anti-competitive claims predating the consummation or-
der, but "[a]s to those allegations based upon the actions of PCTC or its predeces-
sors . . . the court found that . . . [the creditors] would have to obtain the
permission of the reorganization court prior to any further prosecution of their
antitrust claims against PCC." Id. The district court ultimately ruled against the
creditors' claims, "permanently enjoin [ing] them from prosecuting . . . any . . .
action for damages or other relief based upon bankruptcy claims which arose prior
to the 1978 Consummation Order." Id. (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on appeal. See id. at 763.
The circuit court agreed that the creditors had sufficient notice of the possible
discharge of their anti-trust claims and that in failing to assert them prior to the
finalization of PCTC's reorganization plan, the claims were effectively discharged
by section 77 at bankruptcy. See id. at 768-69. The court recognized that because
the creditors' claims accrued pre-petition, they had to either assert the claims or
lose any right to them. See id. The court stated:
We are in complete agreement with . . . the district court in its opinion
dismissing appellant's action to the effect that the purpose of the bank-
ruptcy law and the provisions for reorganization could not be realized if
the discharge of debtors were not complete and absolute; that if courts
should relax the provisions of the law and facilitate the assertion of old
claims against discharged and reorganized debtors, the policy of the law
would be defeated; . . . and that it would be unjust and unfair to those
who had accepted and acted upon the reorganization plan if the court
were thereafter to reopen the plan and change the conditions which con-
stituted the basis of its earlier acceptance.
Id. at 767.
74. See id. at 765-67. According to the Pinney Dock court, an anti-trust claim
"accrues when a defendant commits an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that
injures the plaintiff and results in ascertainable damages." Id. When PCTC reorga-
nized, the acts had already been committed, damages had manifested and the
amount of damages was known. See id. at 766-67. Therefore, because a legal rela-
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legal relationship existed between the parties pre-petition and was
effectively discharged because of PCC's bankruptcy proceedings. 75
Later, in In re Penn Central Transp. Co. (Paoli Yard),76 seeking to
avoid contribution expenses, PCC argued that its reorganization
discharged any previous environmental liability accrued by its pred-
ecessor, PCTC.77 The Paoli Yard court applied the Schweitzer excep-
tion and held that PCC's claims were not discharged when PCTC
reorganized because as Congress had not yet created CERCLA,
there existed no basis for liability at that time. 78
Most recently, the Third Circuit applied the Schweitzer rule in
In re Penn Central Transportation Co. (Bessemer).79 Once again,
PCTC asserted a section 77 reorganization defense against a poten-
tionship existed between the parties prior to bankruptcy, the claims were dis-
charged under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 766-69.
75. See id. at 765-66. The court stated that "such actions constitute bankruptcy
'claims' within the meaning of § 77 since they are based upon federal statutes that
create substantive obligations wholly separate from bankruptcy law." Id. at 766.
76. 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991).
77. See id. at 168.
78. See id.; see also Reading, 115 F.3d at 1122. In Paoli Yard, the Third Circuit
followed the exception to the bankruptcy discharge rule it created in Schweitzer by
analogizing the facts of this case to those present in the Schweitzer case. See Paoli
Yard, 944 F.2d at 166-68. The appellate court focused on the importance of timing
and the existence of a legal relationship between the parties, noting:
[T] hat at the moment of the bankruptcy discharge and the inception of
the injunction, CERCLA had not yet been passed by Congress.... Conse-
quently, at the time of the Consummation Order, there was no statutory
basis for liability to be asserted against PCTC by the petitioners. Just as
the employees in Schweitzer had no recognizable tort causes of action
under the FELA prior to the employer railroad's relevant consummation
dates, the petitioners here could not have brought claims under CERCLA
prior to the Consummation Date.... Under the facts now before us in
this appeal, it was not until the passage of CERCLA that a legal relation-
ship was created between the petitioners and PCC relevant to the peti-
tioners' potential causes of action such that an interest could flow.
Because this legal relationship did not evolve until after the Consumma-
tion Date, the petitioners did not have contingent claims against PCTC.
Accordingly, our decision in Schweitzer leads us to the conclusion that the
petitioners' asserted claims under CERCLA did not constitute dischargea-
ble claims within the meaning of section 77 and thus survive the dis-
charge of the debtor.
Id. at 167-68.
79. 71 F.3d 1113 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996). In Besse-
mer, the appellant filed a claim for indemnity and contribution against the reorga-
nized Penn Central Transportation Company and other railroads for their
individual "participation in antitrust conspiracy." Id. at 1113-14. Prior to the suit,
Penn Central reorganized under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Code, and upon its
official consummation, Penn Central was released "from any further claims predi-
cated upon its pre-consummation acts or conduct." Id. at 1114. Nonetheless, the
appellants sought "indemnity and contribution from Penn Central, as the instiga-
tor, enforcer and primary beneficiary of the conspiracy[,]" for a judgment which
cost Bessemer $592 million dollars. Id.
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tial creditor, and the court applied the Schweitzer-Paoli Yard analy-
sis.80 The Third Circuit examined when, exactly, the creditors' anti-
trust conspiracy claim accrued and determined that the necessary
elements of the claim were not all present until after PCTC reorga-
nized.8 1 Therefore, the creditors' claim against Penn Central was
not discharged at bankruptcy because a legal relationship was not
yet established between the parties pre-petition.8 2 From these
cases, it is evident that the Third Circuit is convinced "that a legal
relationship is a prerequisite for the existence of a claim."83
80. See id. at 1114, 1118. The Third Circuit drew an analogy to Schweitzer in
determining whether the creditors' post-consummation claims were discharged
when Penn Central reorganized. See id. at 1115. The Bessemer court stated that
"[like the subclinical injuries there [meaning in Schweitzer], appellants here had
no cause of action against Penn Central pre-consummation. Because they could
not have filed this action during the Penn Central bankruptcy, Schweitzer's lesson is
that their claims could not have been discharged." Id.
In response, Penn Central argued its creditors had contingent claims that
would have been discharged at bankruptcy, but the Court rejected this argument.
See id. at 1115-16. The Third Circuit applied the analysis used in Schweitzer and
Paoli Yard to determine whether Bessemer had contingent claims for discharge
purposes. See id. at 1115-17. The court held:
[W]e do not believe the plaintiffs had 'interests' of any character before
injury manifested itself. In our view, before one can have an 'interest'
which is cognizable as a contingent claim under section 77, one must
have a legal relationship relevant to the purported interest from which
that interest may flow.
Id. at 1116 (quoting Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 943). Paoli Yard further supported this
decision. The Bessemer court stated:
In Paoli Yard, we made explicit what was implicit in Schweitzer. it is not
sufficient for dischargeability purposes that there was some pre-consum-
mation legal relationship between the debtor and the party later seeking
now to assert a claim; rather, that relationship must be relevant to the claim-
ant's cause of action. When CERCLA was enacted, two fundamental
changes occurred in that relationship: first, Conrail became primarily lia-
ble for the toxic waste cleanup. Second, and more importantly for our
purposes, CERCLA made Penn Central potentially liable to Conrail for
contribution and indemnity. Only then did a legal relationship relevant
to the cause of action arise.
Bessemer, 71 F.3d at 1117 (emphasis added).
81. See Bessemer, 71 F.3d at 1115. According to the precedent'established in
Frenville, "[flor both separate actions and third-party complaints, a claim for contri-
bution or indemnification does not accrue at the time of the commission of the
underlying act, but rather at the time of the payment of the judgment flowing
from that act." Id. (quoting Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337) (emphasis added).
82. See Bessemer, 71 F.3d at 1113, 1117-18. The Third Circuit compared the
facts of Bessemer to those of Schweitzer, stating that "[t] he event triggering contribu-
tion occurred after the date of PCTC's 1973 Consummation Order. As in Schweitzer,
the claim did not yet exist at the time of reorganization and thus was not barred."
Reading, 115 F.3d at 1122. (emphasis added).
83. Kratzke, supra note 14, at 403.
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III. FACTS
On April 1, 1976, the Reading Railroad (Reading) officially
ceased operating as a rail entity, five years after it had filed for reor-
ganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.84 Read-
ing complied with the Regional Rail Reorganization Act's
guidelines and transferred all remaining assets to the Conrail Cor-
poration to begin the reorganization process.8 5 By this point, the
Reading Trustees had already filed an Amended Plan with the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
outlining its intentions for reorganization.8 6 The court notified
both the United States and Conrail, which were potential creditors
of the dissolving Reading.8 7 Neither party objected to the proposed
plan, even after attending hearings discussing the "plan's confirma-
tion and proposed consummation. '"8 8 The court approved Read-
ing's plan and set December 31, 1980 as the official date for
Reading's consummation.89
The "most significant feature" within Reading's consummation
plan was an injunction insulating the newly organized Reading
Company "from all liability based on the obligations of its predeces-
84. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1114 (stating "[flor all practical purposes, Read-
ing ceased to be a railroad on April 1, 1976"). Seven railroads followed Reading's
lead, and filed for bankruptcy in 1973. See id. Congress recognized "[t]he seem-
ingly intractable nature of these bankruptcies, combined with the obvious public
need for continuing rail services" and responded legislatively. Id. Congress passed
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (RRRA) with the stated purpose of
facilitating "the reorganization of railroads... into an economically viable system
capable of providing adequate and efficient rail service .... " Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (2) (Supp. IV 1974). RRRA created a
plan to convey the remaining assets of bankrupt railroads to a new entity, Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation (Conrail). See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1114. Bankrupt compa-
nies received Conrail securities in exchange for those assets, and then had the
opportunity to reorganize as "new, non-rail entities." Id.
85. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1114 (explaining on April 1, 1976, all Reading's
rail assets were transferred to Conrail and former Reading rail employees became
eligible for employment with Conrail).
86. See id. at 1114-15 (highlighting consummation did not occur until 1980
because Reading's reorganization plan lasted for several years).
87. See id. at 1115.
88. Id. The Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a]fter notice, the court shall
hold a hearing on confirmation of a plan. A party in interest may object to confir-
mation of the plan." Bankruptcy Code § 1128(a)-(b), 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a)-
(b) (1994). The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed
this procedure, yet neither Conrail nor the United States, as parties with interests,
objected to the discharge provisions of Reading's proposed plan. See Reading, 115
F.3d at 1114-15.
89. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1115 (noting while consummation date was De-
cember 31, 1980, Congress enacted CERCLAjust three weeks earlier on December
11, 1980, with CERCLA being effective immediately).
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sor," namely, Reading Railroad.90 The injunction prohibited any
individual, corporation and government entity from filing suit
against the newly organized non-rail entity if its primary intention
was to satisfy debts previously incurred by Reading Railroad.91 The
provision guaranteed that any past debts or liabilities would be dis-
charged upon Reading's official consummation. 92 Under the se-
curity of the foregoing provision, the Reading Company emerged
on January 1, 1981, to begin a "fresh start" in the business world.93
During this process, on October 31, 1980, EPA notified Read-
ing that it would treat a hazardous waste site owned by Reading as a
CERCLA site.94 Although Reading was notified before the consum-
mation order officially discharged the bankrupt company from its
debts and liabilities, neither EPA nor the United States filed claims
against the railroad to ensure payment of the costs incurred by the
environmental cleanup of Reading's property.9 5 Furthermore,
neither party mentioned other hazardous waste sites nor "the po-
90. Id. The injunction within Reading's consummation plan read as follows:
All persons, firms, governmental entities and corporations... are hereby
permanently restrained and enjoined from instituting, prosecuting or
pursuing, or attempting to institute, prosecute or pursue, any suits or pro-
ceedings, at law or in equity or otherwise against the Reorganized Com-
pany or its successors or assigns or against any of the assets or property of
the Reorganized Company . . .directly or indirectly, on account of or
based upon any right, claim or interest of any kind or nature whatsoever
which any such person, firm, governmental entity or corporation may
have in, to or against the Debtor, the Reading Trustees, or any of their
assets or properties . ..by reason or on account of any obligation or
obligations incurred by the Debtor or any of its Trustees in these pro-
ceedings ...."
Id. (quoting In re Reading Co., Bankr. No. 71-823 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Memorandum
and Order 2004)).
91. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1115.
92. See id.
93. See id. The Reading court noted that Congress enacted CERCLA while
Reading's consummation plan was in its final stages. See id. Moreover, it stated
that the new authority CERCLA promulgated had a significant impact upon reor-
ganizing railroad entities. See id. Congress, EPA and the railroads themselves rec-
ognized this impact. See id. In Reading, the court emphasized that the railroads
considered CERCLA a threat because it specifically targeted the normal practices
of their industry. See id.; see also 126 CONG. REc. 26,061-62 (1980) (letter to Sen.
Howard H. Cannon from Richard Briggs, Association of American Railroads) (ad-
dressing railroad industry's concerns regarding both legislative provisions increas-
ing its liability as well as governmental involvement in its affairs); Superfund
Hearings, supra note 3, at 225 (singling out railroads as source of "hazardous sub-
stance spills" which amendments to CERCLA target with stiffer legislation).
94. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1115 (commenting "EPA would treat a hazardous
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tential for additional hazardous waste liability" during any of Read-
ing's bankruptcy proceedings. 96
The conflict between Conrail and the Reading Company fo-
cused on a fifty-acre plot of land (the Douglassville site) situated
along the Schuylkill River in Pennsylvania. 97 EPA officially declared
the Douglassville site "a potentially hazardous site" on October 31,
1980.98 On June 12, 1986, EPA asked Reading for information re-
garding the Douglassville site, and later determined on June 29,
1988, that Reading was a PRP.99 OnJuly 31, 1991, the United States
ordered thirty-six PRPs, including Conrail but not Reading, to initi-
ate cleanup measures on the Douglassville site. 100 The United
States filed another claim against this group of PRPs seeking reim-
bursement for all present and future costs associated with its
cleanup; a group from which Reading was once again absent.10 1
Conrail and the other PRPs filed an action against the Reading
Company seeking contribution for all costs accrued under CERCLA
section 107 during the Douglassville cleanup. 10 2 In response, Read-
ing filed a motion for injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming all of its
liability was discharged when it reorganized under the Bankruptcy
Act.103 The court granted the injunction Reading requested 0 4,
96. See id.
97. See id. (claiming appeal resulted from differences concerning responsibil-
ity for site's environmental problems and "the clash of CERCLA liability with the
discharge granted Reading as a result of its bankruptcy"). Since 1941, Douglass-
ville had been the site of "a solvent recovery and oil recycling business." Id.
98. Id. at 1115-16. Even before EPA designated the Douglassville site as a po-
tentially hazardous site, it was familiar with the site's forthcoming environmental
problems. See id. at 1116. For example, in November of 1970, "heavy rains caused
storage lagoons.., to fail [, releasing t]wo to three million gallons of waste sludge
... into the Schuylkill River." Id. Then, in 1972, more sludge flooded the Schuyl-
kill River after Hurricane Agnes struck the East Coast. See id. EPA responded to
the environmental disaster pursuant to the Clean Water Act's oil spill provisions.
See id. During the cleanup process, EPA used the Reading Railroad to transport
sludge away from the Schuylkill River. See id.
99. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1116 (explaining EPA alleged "between July 6,
1965, and March 12, 1976, Reading had either generated or transported ship-
ments of waste oil to Douglassville" and thus qualified as potentially responsible
party).
100. See id. at 1116 n.101 (citing United States v. Berks Assoc., Inc., CIV.A.91 -
4868, 1992 WL 68346 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1992)).
101. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1116.
102. See id. (noting in this third-party action, six hundred other parties in
addition to Reading Company were named as defendants).
103. See id. For the language used in the injunction as part of original order
of Bankruptcy for Reading, see supra note 90.
104. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1116 (citing In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. 738,
741 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).
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and in doing so, it held that because Conrail was a PRP, it could
only sue another PRP, namely Reading, under CERCLA section
113(f).105 Reading's liability under this provision depended upon
whether Reading was also liable to an additional third party; specifi-
cally, the United States. 10 6 The district court held that " [a]ny such
liability had been discharged by the bankruptcy consummation or-
der because all the necessary elements of a CERCIA claim existed
when the plan was consummated and the United States had con-
structive knowledge that the claim existed at the time."1 0 7 Conse-
quently, Reading was found not liable and therefore did not owe
Conrail contribution costs. 10 8 Both Conrail and the United States
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.10 9
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Conrail raised four issues in its appeal to the Third Circuit. It
sought contribution under section 113(f), indemnity for the clean-
up costs incurred at the Douglassville site pursuant to section
107(a) (4) (B), and common law contribution and restitution. 110
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed whether Conrail could
make a valid claim against Reading for the costs accrued during the
Douglassville clean-ups.11' The Reading court divided its analysis
into two sections. The first section addressed the nature of Con-
rail's claim against Reading for contribution, and the second fo-
cused on the effect that Reading's Bankruptcy proceedings had
upon that claim. 112
A. The Nature of Conrail's Claim
The court characterized Conrail's claim against Reading as a
claim for contribution that had to be brought under CERCLA sec-
105. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1116, 1120 (citing CERC[A § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (1994)).
106. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1116.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1111.
110. See id. at 1117.
111. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117 (noting to determine validity of Conrail's
claim, "we [the court] must determine the nature of the cause of action that Con-
rail possesses and whether that cause of action is dependent on Reading's liability
to the United States for costs of the Douglassville clean-up").
112. See id. at 1117, 1121.
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tion 113(f). 113 The claim could not be brought under the common
law principles of restitution or contribution, the court asserted, be-
cause "CERCLA preempts Conrail's common law theories."'114 The
court found that although Congress did not draft CERCLA to ex-
pressly preempt state common law, the passage of CERCLA caused
this result because the remedies available under the statute directly
conflict with those available under the common law theories of res-
titution and contribution. 115 Therefore, the remaining question
for the court was under which specific CERCLA provision Conrail
had to bring its contribution claim. Conrail argued that it had two
separate claims against Reading, one pursuant to section
107(a) (4) (B) and the other pursuant to section 113(f). 116 Reading
challenged Conrail, arguing that the express contribution provision
section 113(f) prevails over the 'judicially created right" for contri-
113. See id. at 1121 (emphasizing CERCLA section 113(f), not CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a), is proper provision to use in pursuing this type of claim).
114. See id. at 1117 (referring to district court's decision and how this decision
and district court's decision mirror one another).
115. See id. The Reading court addressed the issue of preemption to define
the true nature of Conrail's claim. See id. The court highlighted three specific
ways a federal statute can preempt state common law. First, a statute can expressly
preempt the state law. See id. Second, the statute can preempt state law implicitly,
"by so occupying the field with comprehensive federal regulation that it leaves no
room for state law." Id. And third, the federal statute can create a conflict be-
tween it and the state law, and implicitly preempt the latter. See id. In this situa-
tion, a conflict arises because either complying with both the state and federal law
is impossible, or, because the state law impedes achievement of the federal stat-
ute's objectives. See id. See generally California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280-292 (1987) (focusing on implicit way federal laws preempt state
statutes by creating conflict between them).
The Reading court noted that the Third Circuit had addressed the issue of
.preemption by conflict" in the past, but it was not until this particular case that
the Third Circuit specifically recognized that a conflict existed "between ... com-
mon law claims for contribution and restitution and the remedies expressly pro-
vided" by CERCLA. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117. For example, the Reading court
highlighted Manor Care, Inc., v. Yaskin, a previous Third Circuit case addressing
CERCLA and issues of preemption. See id. (citing 950 F.2d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir.
1991)). In Manor Care, the Third Circuit considered whether Congress intended
to preempt state common law principles with the passage of CERCLA. See Manor
Care, 950 F.2d at 125-26. The Manor Care court held that Congress neither ex-
pressly preempted state law with CERCLA nor created a statute that implicitly pre-
empted state law by making it impossible to simultaneously comply with state law
and federal laws. See id. Therefore, the Manor Care court concluded that in evalu-
ating CERCLA claims and issues of preemption, courts must address the conflict
between CERCLA and state law, and determine how that conflict effectively priori-
tized CERCLA. See id. at 125-26, 128. See also Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682,
688 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding appellant could comply with both statute law and
CERCLA provision because two were not "mutually exclusive").
116. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117.
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bution pursuant to section 107(a) (4) (B).' 17 The court agreed with
Reading and held that only section 113(f) was available to Conrail
as a PRP for the contamination of Douglassville. a" 8
In determining which CERCLA provision Conrail could use
against Reading to collect contribution costs, the Third Circuit ex-
amined the specific language as well as the congressional intent of
both CERCLA provisions." 9 The court held that the language of
section 107 is actually narrower than courts have previously inter-
preted it, and therefore only empowered an innocent party to file
suit against one or more responsible parties for its recovery costs.
120
Alternatively, section 113(f) expressly permits one PRP to file a
claim against another PRP for contribution of the costs it has in-
curred during an environmental cleanup.1 21 Accordingly, section
113(f) was the only viable option for Conrail because it was not an
innocent party, but instead was as responsible for Douglassville's
contamination as Reading. Furthermore, the court stated that
"Congress intended to replace § 107(a) (4) (B)'s implied contribu-
tion remedy when it enacted § 113(f).122
Conrail advanced two final arguments in favor of its independ-
ent section 107 claim for contribution. First, Conrail indicated the
actual language of section 113, which specifically refers to the per-
missibility of "a civil action" under section 107.123 The court easily
dismissed this argument by stating:
The fact [that] . . .§ 113(f) mentions the availability of a
civil action under § 107(a) does not afortiori indicate that
Congress intended to permit an action for contribution to
be brought either under § 107(a) or under § 113(f), at
117. Id. The Reading court accepted Reading's position and stated that in an
action which presents a claim for apportionment of clean-up costs, "section 113(f)
trumps [section] 107(a) (4) (B)." Id.
118. See id. at 1119-20. The Reading court noted that Congress intended the
remedy provided by section 113(f) to be an "efficient resolution of environmental
disputes." Id. at 1117. The court feared that "[ p]ermitting independent common
law remedies would create a path around the statutory settlement scheme, raising
an obstacle to the intent of Congress." Id. It accordingly held that CERCLA's
provision for contribution preempted Conrail's common law claims for contribu-
tion and restitution, making the latter two unavailable to Conrail. Id.
119. See id. at 1117-20 (explaining congressional intent is focus of preemption
analysis and examining language assists in identifying that intent).
120. See id. at 1119-120 (commenting until SARA, section 107 served as gap-
filler, and once Congress enacted SARA, section 113 became appropriate section
to rely on in seeking contribution).
121. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120.
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the discretion of the litigant. After all, a "civil action" can
be initiated for direct costs, as well as for contribution.1 24
Conrail next argued that it could bring a claim for contribu-
tion under section 107, based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States.125 In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court
addressed whether sections 107 and 113 permitted contribution,
and held that the "overlap" between the two statutory provisions did
not confer a discretionary right upon a PRP to choose under which
provision to file suit.1 26 Instead, the Supreme Court in Key Tronic
illustrated how various courts have interpreted the private rights of
action authorized by section 107(a) (4) (B) differently.1 27 The
Third Circuit, however, relied on the statute's plain meaning and
held that section 113(f), not section 107(a) (4) (A), was the appro-
priate provision for Conrail to use in seeking its remedy of
contribution. 128
B. Conrail's Claim in Light of Reading's Bankruptcy
The Reading court began its evaluation of the effect Reading's
bankruptcy proceedings had on Conrail's claim by reviewing the
precedent previous Third Circuit cases had established when ad-
dressing "the discharge of claims [at] bankruptcy." 29 Those cases
structured the Third Circuit's application of section 77 discharges
to environmental claims, and the Reading court accordingly struc-
tured its analysis and began by determining whether Conrail's CER-
124. Id. at 1119-20.
125. See id. at 1120 (citing Key Tronic, 511 U.S. 809 (1994)). Conrail based its
argument on a statement within the Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic. See
Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. The controversial comment in the Key Tronic decision
reads: "[T]he statute [CERCLA] now expressly authorizes a cause of action for
contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlap-
ping remedy in § 107." Id. (quoting Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816).
126. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120 (explaining overlap exists because some
courts have permitted direct actions by landowners under section 107 to recover
costs from responsible parties).
127. See id. According to the Reading court,
The fact [that] ... a direct action might be brought under § 107(a) does
not open the door for a PRP to bring an action for contribution under
that same section. Indeed, the fact that § 113(f) (1) specifically permits
an action for contribution to be brought "in the absence of a civil action
under . . . [section 9607]" reenforces our conclusion that Congress in-
tended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking contribution ....
Id. (emphasis added).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1121. The Reading court primarily relied upon four previous Third
Circuit decisions: Schweitzer, Paoli Yard, Pinney Dock, and Bessemer. See id. at 1121-26.
For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
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CIA claim existed at the time of Reading's bankruptcy.130 The
court stated that unless the interest could be characterized as a con-
tingent claim where no legal relationship existed between the par-
ties at the time of bankruptcy, if the claim existed prior to
reorganization, it was discharged 31 The Third Circuit, relying on
Paoli Yard, accepted Conrail's section 113(f) claim for contribu-
tion.132 The court held that Conrail's claim was not discharged
when Reading filed for bankruptcy because Congress had not yet
enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA).1 33 Thus, without either a statutory basis for liability
or a legal relationship between the parties, the court reaffirmed
that a claim did not yet exist for discharge purposes.134
Although the court found that Conrail's claim was not dis-
charged at bankruptcy, the Third Circuit held that the claim failed
130. See id. at 1123. In describing the analytical framework for section 77 dis-
charges, the Reading court stated:
[W]e must determine whether the CERCLA claim had accrued at the
time of the reorganization. If so, then it was discharged. To determine
whether a claim existed, we look to the substantive area of law governing
the underlying claim. If a claim had not accrued, then we must deter-
mine whether the claimant possessed an interest rising to the level of a
contingent claim that would be discharged.
Id. (citations omitted).
131. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1123-25 (analyzing relevant case law as applicable
to Reading). For a discussion of contingent claims, see supra note 26 and accompa-
nying text.
132. See id. at 1123.
133. See id. (comparing non-existence of CERCLA at time of bankruptcy in
Paoli Yard with non-existence of SARA at time of bankruptcy in Reading).
134. See id. Congress did not enact SARA and its particular contribution pro-
vision until 1986, whereas Reading's official consummation occurred six years ear-
lier, in 1980. See id. at 1115, 1123. Reading argued that section 113(f) "permits a
contribution action based on perspective liability." Id. at 1123. In support of its
proposition, Reading used the plain language of section 9163(f), which states, "any
person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under § 9607(a) of this title .... Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of civil
action . . . ." Id. (quoting CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)). Reading also
asserted that legal precedent demonstrates that the Third Circuit has found "an
implied right of action under [CERCLA] § 107(a) (4) (B)." Id.
The Reading court rejected this argument because the result would be unfair
to Conrail. See id. The Reading court refused to punish Conrail for failing to assert
a claim which had no legal basis until years later. See id. First, because SARA sec-
tion 113(f) did not exist in 1980, Conrail did not, at that time, have an express
claim for contribution against Reading when it reorganized. See id. Furthermore,
the Reading court stated that even if it accepted section 107(a) (4) (B)'s implied
contribution provision, courts did not legally recognize this implied right of action
until after Reading reorganized. See id. The Reading court applied Paoli Yard, hold-
ing that because Conrail's claim did not exist at the time of bankruptcy, it was
therefore not discharged at bankruptcy. See id.
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as a matter of law.13 5 The court stated that for Conrail to have a
legitimate claim for contribution under CERCLA section 113(f),
Conrail and Reading must have shared joint liability to a common
third party, which was in this case the United States.1 3 6 The court
held that neither Conrail nor Reading were liable to the United
States, because all claims it had against Reading were discharged at
bankruptcy.13 7 Therefore, Conrail's section 113(f) claim could not
proceed because joint liability, an essential element of its contribu-
tion claim, was missing.'38
The joint liability element was described in Reading by the
Third Circuit's use of the traditional common law meaning of con-
tribution in its interpretation of section 113(f). 13 9 This definition
requires "some form ofjoint liability" between the plaintiff and the
defendant to the same third party.140 Conrail argued that the defi-
nition of contribution in section 113(f) moved beyond the joint lia-
bility requirement, but the Reading court disagreed.' 4 ' The court
feared that if contribution was not limited to its traditional com-
mon law meaning, "contribution could become an endless circle of
135. See id.
136. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1123 (establishing that while right to bring claim
for contribution existed, mere existence of this right did not suffice to obtain
favorable judgment).
137. See id. at 1123.
138. See id. at 1123-24. The United States asked the Third Circuit to remand
the case so that the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could
determine "the derivative nature of the contribution claim and [resolve] its poten-
tial failure . . . ." Id. The court denied this request, asserting that remanding the
case would be a waste of judicial time because the district court had already de-
cided the issue. See id. Instead, the Third Circuit exercised plenary review and
reexamined the district court's decision. See id. at 1124. Second, the Reading court
explained, "although an absence ofjoint liability may be a defense, when there is
no question that joint liability is lacking, a necessary element to establish contribu-
tion cannot be proven." Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. The Reading court used the specific language of section 113(f) to
support its common law approach to defining "contribution." See id. The Reading
court stated that "CERCLA § 113(f) captures the requirements of joint liability in
its statutory language: 'Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title' . . . ." Id.
(quoting CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994)).
141. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1124 (stating "Conrail argues that common liabil-
ity by two or more defendants to one common government agency is not necessary
under § 113(f)"). The Reading court adopted the same traditional common law
definition for contribution that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(UCAT) expresses. See id. The UCAT provides "where two or more persons be-
come jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or
for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even
though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." Id. (quoting
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 1955).
[Vol. IX: p. 561
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attempts to seek reimbursement from unrelated parties.' 42 There-
fore, because section 113(f) uses the common law definition of con-
tribution, the success of Conrail's claim for contribution depended
on whether Reading was also liable to the United States under sec-
tion 107(a).143
Conrail also argued that liability existed under section
107(a) (4) (A), but the Reading court discounted this assertion. 44
The court ruled that section 107(a) was only available to an inno-
cent party who sued the responsible party for total indemnification
of the environmental cleanup costs it incurred. 145 The Reading
court stated that Conrail was not an innocent party, and therefore,
recovery under this section was unavailable. 146 It characterized
Conrail as a PRP, and held that only section 113(f) allows one PRP
to recover contribution expenses from another PRP. 147 Still, with-
out common liability to a third party, the section 113(f) claim
failed. 148
After deciding that common liability was essential to the suc-
cess of Conrail's section 113(f) claim, the court addressed how
Reading's reorganization affected its relationship with the United
States.'49 The court applied the Schweitzer-Paoli Yard analysis and
held that all four requirements for a CERCLA claim existed before
Reading reorganized. 50 Therefore, because the United States in-
curred its environmental cleanup costs prior to Reading's reorgani-
142. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1124.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1124-25. Conrail claimed that according to the statutory lan-
guage of CERCLA, it was entitled to contribution costs under section 107(a). See
id. Section 107(a) (4) (A) makes PRPs liable for "costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion incurred by the United States Government. .. ." Id. at 1125 (quoting CER-
CIA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A)). In addition, CERCLA makes
PRPs liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
.... " Id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). Conrail used CERCLA's
language to assert that common liability to the United States is not necessary
under section 107(a)(4)(A). See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1125. The court rejected this
argument because as a PRP itself, Conrail could only seek contribution, not total
indemnification. See id. The court therefore held that "Reading's § 113(f) liability
depends on its liability to the United States." Id.
145. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120-21 (explaining case facts clearly show Con-
rail was seeking contribution and therefore had to file under section 113).
146. See id. at 1120, 1124-25.
147. See id. at 1116, 1120-21.
148. See id. at 1126 (highlighting since Reading did not qualify as either liable
or potentially liable under section 107(a) (4) (A), it could not be liable to Conrail).
149. See id.
150. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1125. For a discussion of the necessary CERCLA
elements, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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zation, any liability Reading had to the United States was effectively
discharged at bankruptcy.15 1
The United States argued that its claims against Reading were
not discharged because it did not have sufficient knowledge of the
claim when it accepted Reading's reorganization plan. 152 The
court dismissed this argument because it found ample support for
the district court's finding that the United States was, or should
have been, fully aware of the nature of its claim against Reading
before it filed for bankruptcy. 153 Consequently, the United States'
CERCLA claim was discharged at bankruptcy, and Reading was
thereby released from any liability.1 54 Reading was neither liable,
151. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1126. Reading easily satisfied the first three CER-
CLA elements in that it was one of the responsible parties, hazardous substances
were dumped at the Douglassville site and a "release" according to CERCLA had
occurred. See id. This reality left only the question of when exactly the United
States incurred clean-up costs; before or after Reading's consummation. See id.
CERCLA defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers,
and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant)...." CERCLA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994). The remain-
ing element would only be satisfied if the United States assumed the cleanup costs
for Douglassville before Reading reorganized. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1125. The
Reading court affirmed that Reading satisfied all four CERCLA elements stating:
In both 1970 and 1972, federal environmental agencies, acting pursuant
to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, undertook cleanups of massive
releases from the Douglassville site. These cleanups meet the definition
of a "removal action." The United States never recovered its "response
costs" for these efforts. Consequently, on the date of Reading's § 77 re-
organization, all four CERCLA elements were met. The United States
possessed an actual claim against Reading.
Id.
152. See Reading, 115 F. 3d at 1126.
153. See id. Any questions regarding a party's knowledge are questions of fact
the court reviews for the presence of clear error. See id. The Third Circuit de-
ferred to the district court's findings that the United States had considerable evi-
dence of its claim against Reading at the time of bankruptcy. See id. In support of
its decision, the circuit court noted the following facts the district court had found:
[T]he United States knew the Douglassville site was an environmental
trouble spot and Reading Railroad was connected to it; by October 31,
1980, the EPA had identified the site as potential hazardous waste site;
federal officials had twice responded to cleanup needs at the site; EPA
knew Reading Railroad had operated a rail line to the site; in 1972 EPA
had ordered Reading Railroad to haul waste from the site; and ICC tar-
iffs, available as part of bankruptcy proceedings, showed that Reading
transported hazardous materials to the site.
Id. (citing In re Reading Co., 900 F. Supp. at 745-46). The district court also relied
on "the length of the Reading Railroad's bankruptcy [and] the government's sub-
stantial participation in it." Id.
154. See id. The Reading court stated that "under our decisions in Schweitzer
and Paoli Yard, the United States' CERCLA claim against Reading for environmen-
tal clean-up at the Douglassville site was discharged in the § 77 reorganization." Id.
40
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/6
READING COMPANY
nor potentially liable, under section 107(a) (4) (A) and was there-
fore not liable to Conrail for any contribution. 155 Thus, the court
held that Conrail's claim under section 113 (f) failed as a matter of
law. 156
V. CRITICG ANALYSIS
The Reading court's decision is consistent with previous Third
Circuit decisions addressing the conflict between CERCLA's strict
liability provisions and the Bankruptcy Code's all-encompassing dis-
charge provision.' 57 Similar to the decisions in Union Scrap and
Schweitzer, the Third Circuit adopted the legal relationship test in
Reading.15 8 The Third Circuit applied the Schweitzer-Paoli Yard test
to the facts of the Reading case and determined that without a legal
basis of liability between the parties, Conrail had no cause of action
against Reading for contribution.' 5 9
At the outset of its analysis, the Reading court properly applied
both the broad definition of "claim" Congress has advanced as well
as the opinions set forth in Kovacs, Schweitzer and other similar
cases. 160 The court was also correct in determining that Reading's
CERCLA obligations qualified as "claims" under the Bankruptcy
Code and would be discharged as long as they accrued pre-peti-
tion.' 61 The court also recognized that for Conrail to have a legiti-
mate claim against Reading for contribution, the parties were
required to share liability to a common third party, like that ex-
155. See id.
156. See id. In its conclusion, the court acknowledged the continual conflict
between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Act. See id. It stated that "[i] n reaching this
conclusion, we have not elevated bankruptcy law over CERCLA, nor do we per-
ceive a clash between the two systems. Each performs its respective function. Our
opinion merely demonstrates that CERCLA claims are treated like any other claim
in bankruptcy." Id.
157. For a discussion of the other Third Circuit cases addressing the conflict
between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, see supra notes 64-83 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120-25. For a discussion of the legal relation-
ship test applied in Union Scrap, Schweitzer and Paoli Yard, see supra notes 55-83 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the alternative approaches courts have
taken, see supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
159. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1123-26. For further discussion of the Reading
court's application and analysis, see supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
160. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1121. For a discussion of the authorities the
court relied on for its broad definition of "claim," see supra notes 29-31, 33-83 and
accompanying text.
161. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1123. For a discussion of why the Bankruptcy
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isting between the debtor and creditor in Union Scrap.162 Because
common liability to a third party was absent between Reading and
Conrail when Conrail's claim accrued, so too, was the legal relation-
ship needed to base Conrail's contribution claim upon. 163
In addition to correctly applying the legal relationship test de-
fined by the Third Circuit, the Reading court accurately interpreted
the conditions under which sections 107 (a) and 113 (f) are available
to either the federal government or private plaintiffs. 64 The court
recognized that the judicially-created right to contribution under
section 107(a) became ineffective once Congress passed the SARA
amendments, and more particularly, with the creation of section
113.165 According to the express language of that provision, as well
as the congressional intent behind it, the Reading court properly
concluded that section 107 was only available to an innocent party.
Therefore, a PRP seeking contribution instead of total indemnifica-
tion, would have to seek action pursuant to section 113(f).166 This
statutory interpretation parallels those of other courts.
The Reading court made another important decision when it
chose to balance the objectives and legal principles of both CER-
CLA and the Bankruptcy Code in achieving the most equitable so-
lution. 167 Unlike other courts which have favored the public policy
considerations of one statute at the expense of the other, the Read-
ing court followed the approach the In re National Gypsum court
chose. 168 In deciding whether Conrail had a valid claim for contri-
bution against Reading, the court refused to elevate one statute
over the other and assigned both statutes the same priority. 69
162. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1124. For a discussion of Union Scrap's analysis of
the legal relationship test, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. For infor-
mation on other Third Circuit cases adopting the legal relationship approach, see
supra notes 63-155 and accompanying text.
163. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1124-26. For more information on the Reading
court's holding and reasoning, see supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the conditions necessary for sections 107(a) and
113(f) claims, see supra note 16-17 and accompanying text.
165. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1118-20. For more information on the replace-
ment of section 107's implicit contribution provision with section 113's express
provision, see supra notes 2,16 and accompanying text.
166. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1118-20.
167. See id. at 1126. For a discussion of how the Reading court reached its
decision, see supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text. For an example of ap-
proaches similar to that used in the Reading court, see supra notes 50-54 and ac-
companying text.
168. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1126. For a discussion of other courts which
have not used a balancing approach and which have instead favored one statute
over the other, see supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
169. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1126.
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In re Reading can have a positive effect on the Third Circuit as
well as other circuit courts confronted with the conflict between
CERCLA's strict liability provisions and the Bankruptcy Code's au-
tomatic discharge policy. First, the Reading court strengthened the
precedent under which courts had applied the legal relationship
test to these cases. Second, the Third Circuit will continue to reject
assigning one statute's goals priority over the other's. Hopefully, by
continuing to support a more equitable and balanced approach to
the traditional conflict between the two statutes, other courts will
follow the Third Circuit's lead and adopt a uniform and fair posi-
tion within their own jurisdictions. Moreover, Congress may realize
the need to address the conflict between CERCLA and the Bank-
ruptcy Code and "knock out" this conflict by amending either the
Bankruptcy Code or CERCLA.
Although this case is consistent with prior Third Circuit deci-
sions, it nevertheless illustrates that courts remain divided and un-
able to resolve the conflict between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code without some legislative guidance. 170 Congress must revise
the Bankruptcy Code and address how courts should deal with envi-
ronmental obligations, past, present and future, when they are con-
fronted with the Bankruptcy Code's discharge provisions. Absent
Congressional action, either bankruptcy law or environmental law
will continue to suffer.171 Therefore, "[t]he interests of debtors
and environmental authorities would be better served by predict-
able treatment of environmental claims than by the current
inconsistencies." 172
Jennifer A. Pasquarella
170. See Kratzke, supra note 14, at 409 (explaining lack of solid guidelines
leads to confusion in this area and prolongs "existing legal dilemma"). Kratzke
notes that because it falls outside the scope of the judiciary's power to rewrite the
Bankruptcy Code, "Congress should seriously consider amendment to alleviate the
growing problem . . . ." Id. at 416.
171. See McBain, supra note 26, at 263 (explaining following one bankruptcy
court's holding does not suffice and "the appropriate means of directing courts is
through amendment to the Code or Rules")
172. Id. at 260.
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